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INTRODUCTION
Congress encourages home ownership by allowing taxpayers to
deduct qualified residence interest in calculating taxable income.'
Generally, Congress allows deductions for business2 and investment 3
expenses but disallows deductions for personal4 expenses. Congress
gradually has reformed the income tax laws to align interest ex-
penses with the general rule. Thus, instead of allowing a deduction
for nearly all interest paid or accrued during the taxable year, as
it did in 1954,5 the Internal Revenue Code currently allows a
- See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (1988).
2 See id. § 162(a) (1988) (allowing as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business).
3 See id. § 212 (1988) (allowing "as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year ... for the production or collection of
income ... [and] for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for
the production of income").
4 See id. § 262(a) (1988) (disallowing all deductions for personal, living, and family
expenses except as otherwise expressly authorized in the Internal Revenue Code).
I See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 46 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 163). Congress disallowed certain interest payments with respect to insurance, endowment,
or annuity contracts, see id. at 68A Stat. 77 (current version at I.R.C. § 264 (1988)), tax-
exempt income, see id. at 68A Stat. 78 (current version at I.R.C. § 265(2) (1988)), carrying
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deduction for most interest paid or incurred in a taxpayer's trade
or business6 or in investment activities7 and disallows all deductions
for personal interest expenses." Despite prohibiting personal interest
deductions, Congress specifically allows a deduction for qualified
residence interest. 9
The preferential treatment afforded home mortgage interest
partially reflects political reality: the average taxpayer has become
accustomed to deducting mortgage interest and likely would be
outraged if Congress eliminated the deduction. Although Congress
could remove the preferential tax treatment given homeowners,
indications are that it will not:
"There is no basic principle in tax law that is more supported by
the American people than the principle that you ought to be able
to deduct interest on your home from your taxes. We have taken
a position that home ownership is something that we want to
promote, that that is an objective of our tax policy that is strongly
supported, and it is reflected in this bill.... 
This attitude underlies the home mortgage interest deduction and
other tax preferences for homeowners.
charges chargeable to capital accounts, see id. (current version at I.R.C. § 266 (1988)
(providing for election by taxpayer whether to charge to capital account or to deduct certain
interest payments)), and certain transactions between related taxpayers, see id. (current
version at I.R.C. § 267 (1988)). Otherwise, interest payments were deductible without
limitation.
See I.R.C. § 163(a); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(a)(4)(i)(A) (1987). But see I.R.C.
§ 163(0(1) (disallowing an otherwise deductible interest expense if the interest is paid on
any registration-required obligation that is not in registered form).
See I.R.C. § 163(d) (limiting investment interest deductions to the taxpayer's net
investment income for the year); id. §§ 163(h)(2)(C), 469(a) (1988) (limiting losses from
passive activities to the amount of income from passive activities for the year). In both
instances, interest not allowed in any year may be carried over to following years until they
become deductible. See id. § 163(d)(2) (investment interest); id. § 469(b) (passive activity
losses).
9 See id. § 163(h)(1).
9 See id. § 163(h)(2)(D); H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., v. II, at 11-154
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4242. Congress also allows deductions for
interest on certain payments of estate taxes owed because of an extension of time to pay
the estate tax on the value of a reversionary or remainder interest or extension of time to
pay estate tax when the estate consists largely of an interest in a closely held business. See
I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(E).
10 132 CoNG. REc. S7387 (daily ed. June 12, 1986) (statement of Sen. Gramm) (Senator
Gramm referred to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085
(codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.)).
" See, e.g., I.R.C. § 164(a) (1988) (allowing deduction for real estate taxes); id. §
280A(c)(1) (1988) (allowing deduction for business use of home).
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This Article analyzes the arguments for and against the home
mortgage interest deduction and evaluates the current treatment of
qualified residence interest. Part I reviews the recent legislative
history of qualified residence interest. This discussion includes
congressional introduction of the concept of qualified residence
interest, 1987 modifications, and 1990 simplification proposals.
12
Part II delves into theories advanced for and against allowing a
deduction for home mortgage interest. After Part II-A summarizes
laws that help Americans purchase homes, 3 Part I-B advances a
theory that home ownership should be bifurcated into a personal
living component and an investment component.14 Expenses attrib-
utable to the personal living component should be nondeductible.
Expenses attributable to the investment component, including mort-
gage interest, should be deductible. This theory appears in later
discussions as well.
Part II-C evaluates common arguments advanced for denying
the home mortgage interest deduction, concluding that all are
unpersuasive under our current tax system." Part II-D analyzes
horizontal equity arguments by (1) comparing persons that borrow
to purchase a residence with persons that dispose of other assets
to purchase a home, (2) comparing persons that borrow with those
that save to buy a home, (3) comparing renters to homeowners,
and (4) comparing homeowners to other real estate investors.' 6
Finally, Part II-E discusses two separate issues.17 That part first
discusses the problems associated with tracing interest payments to
loan proceeds. Next, it considers whether homeowners should de-
duct the full interest payment or whether they should capitalize the
interest's inflation component.
Part III evaluates the current law authorizing deductions for
qualified residence interest. Under the heading of "Acquisition
Indebtedness," part III-A addresses the two-qualified-residence au-
thorization, 8 the requirement that the residence secure the debt,' 9
and the treatment of refinanced acquisition indebtedness. 20 Part
22 See infra notes 23-125 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 126-145 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 146-156 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 157-186 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 187-227 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 228-248 and accompanying text.
Is See I.R.C. § 163(h)(4).
19 See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(II).
See infra notes 250-271 and accompanying text.
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III-B criticizes the home equity indebtedness provision, concluding
that Congress should repeal the provision.2 Finally, in part III-C,
the article leaves open the option of allowing some personal interest
deduction in place of allowing interest on home equity indebted-
ness. If Congress allows a personal interest deduction, however,
part III-C argues Congress should not restrict personal interest to
enumerated accepted purposes. Also, any restriction on deductible
personal interest should be based on maximum interest amount
rather than on maximum debt amount. Furthermore, personal
interest should not be combined with investment interest in deter-
mining maximum current deductible amounts.22
I. RECENT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Tax Reform Act of 1986
Congress redefined "qualified residence interest" in 1987, 2
only one year after introducing the term in the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (the "1986 Act")34 Under the 1986 Act, qualified residence
interest was defined as interest paid or accrued during the taxable
year on indebtedness secured by a qualified residence.Y A qualified
residence was defined to include both the taxpayer's principal
residence and one other residence of the taxpayer's choosing.2 6 The
awkwardly worded 1986 Act limited the amount of the underlying
residence indebtedness for which an interest deduction was allow-
able to the taxpayer's basis in the residence, plus the aggregate
amount of any loans for qualified medical expenses or qualified
educational expenses.27 Notwithstanding this formula for determin-
2, See infra notes 272-298 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 299-308 and accompanying text.
23 See Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10102, 101 Stat. 1330-382, 1330-
384 to 1330-386 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (1988)).
2 See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511, 100 Stat. 2085, 2247 (repealed 1987).
2See id.
26 See id. at 2248.
2 See id. at 2247. Basis was to be adjusted only by the cost of any improvements to
the residence. See id. Notwithstanding this dictate, basis for this purpose was not to be less
than the aggregate outstanding indebtedness with respect to the residence incurred before
passage of the 1986 Act. See id.
Qualified medical expenses included medical expenses for the taxpayer, spouse, or a
dependent. See id. at 2248. Qualified educational expenses included tuition, living expenses,
and related expenses of attending a qualified educational institution, incurred by the tax-
payer, his spouse, or a dependent. See id. at 2247-48.
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lug the underlying residence indebtedness, in no event could the
amount of the underlying residence indebtedness exceed the quali-
fied residence's fair market value.3
As introduced in the Senate, the Act disallowed any consumer
interest deduction, except for qualified residence interest.29 Quali-
fied residence interest was any interest paid or accrued during the
taxable year on indebtedness secured by a qualified residence. 0
The only restriction was that the amount of the qualified residence
indebtedness could not exceed the fair market value of the qualified
residence at the time the debt was incurred.3 1 Several senators
introduced an amendment to change the definition of qualified
residence interest by restricting the permissible uses of debt pro-
ceeds. 32 The proposed change defined qualified residence interest
as interest on any indebtedness that was secured by a qualified
residence and that was incurred (1) to acquire, construct, rehabil-
itate, or improve a qualified residence, (2) to pay medical expenses,
(3) to pay education expenses of the taxpayer or his child, or (4)
to refinance the principal amount of any of the above indebtedness
plus the cost of such refinancing. 3
The senators proposed the amendment for two independent
reasons. First, several senators wanted taxpayers to elect to deduct
either state and local general sales tax or state and local income
taxes, rather than being allowed to deduct only state and local
income taxes. 34 Since Congress was working under guidelines pre-
venting amendments that would raise the deficit, 35 the senators
sought to pay for the sales tax or state income tax deduction
election by reducing the amount of interest qualifying for the
See id. at 2247.
29 See H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 2266-67 (1986).
30 See id. at 2267.
:I See id. at 2267-68.
32 See 132 CONO. REc. S7386, S7386-87 (daily ed. June 12, 1986) (proposal by Sen.
Evans, Sen. Gramm, Sen. Gorton, Sen. Laxalt, Sen. Abdnor, and Sen. Pressler). Some of
these senators were more interested in a companion provision authorizing a sales tax
deduction than the qualified residence interest amendment.
3 See id.
34 See id. (statement of Sen. Evans). The then existing provision allowed deduction
of all state and local income and sales taxes. See Revenue Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 88-
272, § 207, 78 Stat. 40, repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 134,
100 Stat. 2116.
31 See 132 CoNo. REc. at S7387 (statement of Sen. Gramm); see also Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman) Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1038 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
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qualified residence interest deduction.3 Second, some senators
viewed a taxpayer's ability to claim an interest deduction on all
loans secured by a qualified residence, even purely personal loans,
as a loophole needing elimination. 37 Apparently, the second view
prevailed because the 1986 Act contained a restrictive definition of
qualified residence interest38 but did not allow any deduction for
state and local general sales taxes.3 9
Requiring a legitimate purpose and use of loan proceeds seemed
necessary to prevent abuses. Otherwise, the prohibition against
personal interest deductions, e.g., to purchase an automobile, to
finance a vacation, or to buy a fur coat, could be circumvented
by pledging a qualified residence as security for a loan.40 Even as
the 1986 Act was debated, lending institutions promoted borrowing
against house equity for personal uses because of the tax advantage
in deducting home mortgage interest.41 Many senators felt that a
taxpayer should not be allowed to transform nondeductible per-
sonal interest into deductible qualified residence interest simply by
pledging a qualified residence as collateral. 42
The proposed amendment, and the 1986 Act as enacted, did
allow deductions for interest paid on debt incurred to pay qualified
medical expenses or qualified educational expenses as long as a
qualified residence secured the indebtedness. 43 These two exceptions
were contrary to limiting qualified residence interest to the stated
legitimate purpose of purchasing or improving a residence. Allow-
ing deductions for these personal purposes, but not for others,
troubled several senators. Some senators, in fact, wanted all interest
secured by a qualified residence, at least on indebtedness up to the
fair market value of the residence, to continue to be deductible
regardless of the taxpayer's purpose or use of proceeds."4
- See 132 CoNG. Rxc. at S7387.
- See id. at S7387-88, S7401 (statement of Sen. Gramm).
See Tax Reform Act of 1986, 100 Stat. at 2247.
39 See id.
4 "See 132 CONG. REc. S7388, S7391-92 (daily ed. June 12, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Gramm).
" See id. at 57391.
42 See id.
" See Tax Reform Act of 1986, 100 Stat. at 2247-48.
4 See, e.g., 132 CoNo. REc. S7390, S7390-91 (daily ed. June 12, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Boren) (stressing the myriad emergencies that could necessitate pledging a residence
for a loan and expressing concern about the administrative difficulties of tracing uses of
loan proceeds); id. at S7396-97 (statement of Sen. Chafee) (admonishing Congress not to
decide what is good or bad by allowing deductions for some interest expenditures and not
1991-92]
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A recurring sentiment was that the taxpayer's residence was in
many cases the taxpayer's most significant asset 4 and principal
means of savings.41 The taxpayer should be able to borrow against
the equity in his residence, argued some senators, not only to pay
for his children's education or for medical expenses, but for any
reason he deemed fit to benefit himself or his family.47 Senator
Boren stressed that Congress might justify an interest deduction
for a taxpayer that used his home equity to finance unforeseeable
emergencies or to help a newly married couple buy a first home
or start a business.49 In the same vein, a taxpayer might need to
borrow money to assist elderly parents. 0 Senator Durenberger voiced
concern that a taxpayer might need to take out a home equity loan
to "get over the hurdle of unemployment."' 51 Senator Chafee ar-
gued for no limitation on the use of loan proceeds at all. He felt
that a person should have the right to borrow against his home
equity to finance a $200,000 or $300,000 sailboat if he wished, and
the government should not tell him or any American that buying
a sailboat was not a good use of his home equity. 2
At several junctures, Senator Gramm felt compelled to explain
that the provision did not prevent or limit in any way the ability
of a person to borrow against his residence.53 The provision merely
denied deductions of interest if the proceeds were used for purposes
other than for the acquisition or improvement of a qualified resi-
dence or for the payment of qualified medical or educational
purposes.5 4 Senator Gramm noted that the Senate Finance Com-
for others and arguing that a person whose children have graduated from college should be
able to buy a sailboat and deduct the interest and that the practical potential for abuse was
being exaggerated).
41 See, e.g., id. at S7395 (statement of Sen. Ford).
46 See, e.g., id. at S7390 (statement of Sen. Boren).
4, See, e.g., id. at S7393 (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
- See id. at S7390 (statement of Sen. Boren).
49 See id.
5o See id.
51 Id. at S7394 (statement of Sen. Durenberger). Senator Durenberger noted that a
person that refinanced his home to have money to live while unemployed could not deduct
the interest while a family with a higher income could take out a home equity loan to
finance their "kid's education at some fancy private school." Id. Likewise, middle-class
parents could not borrow against home equity and deduct the interest to help their children
buy a home, but a family in Beverly Hills could deduct interest for adding a wing to their
two million dollar home. See id.
2 See id. at S7396-97 (statement of Sen. Chafee).
" See, e.g., id. at S7393 (statement of Sen. Gramm).
5See id.
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mittee already had determined that consumer interest would not be
deductible. Thus, the suggested provision just eliminated an unin-
tended loophole whereby taxpayers could deduct consumer interest
simply by pledging a qualified residence to secure the underlying
indebtedness. 5
A concern best expressed by Senator Boren focused on the
administrative difficulty of enforcing the restriction. 56 How, won-
dered Senator Boren, can an auditor determine or a taxpayer show
that an expenditure traced from a loan was for education or for
medical expenses if the taxpayer spent money on ten other major
items?5 17 To illustrate his point, Senator Boren wondered how any-
one could tell if a loan was for educational purposes if the recipient
was simultaneously paying on a car loan, paying on a small busi-
ness loan, and sending money to elderly parents.5 8
Senator Gramm answered the administrative concerns by noting
that the Treasury Department had assured Congress that it could
enforce the proposed provision.5 9 Unfortunately, his example of
enforcement mechanisms understated the possible administrative
difficulties. To illustrate, Senator Gramm explained how section
461(g) allows a homeowner to deduct points currently if the pur-
pose of the underlying loan is to acquire or to improve a home. 60
On the other hand, if the mortgage is for some purpose other than
to acquire or improve a principal residence, the points are treated
as prepaid interest and, under the general rule of section 461(g),
must be capitalized and amortized over the life of the loan.6' To
SS See id. at S7391.
See Id. at S7390 (statement of Sen. Boren).
37 See id.
See id.
" See Id. at S7391 (statement of Sen. Gramm).
60 See id.
,1 See Id. The general rule requires capitalization of prepaid interest and amortization
over the life of the loan. See I.R.C. § 461(g)(1) (1988). The only statutory exception to the
general rule allows taxpayers to deduct points paid on the purchase or improvement of the
taxpayer's principal residence. See id. § 461(g)(2). The Service has indicated that a taxpayer
that refinances a previously qualifying mortgage cannot deduct points paid on refinancing
because the proceeds of the refinanced loan are deemed to have been used to retire a debt
and not to purchase or improve a principal residence. See Rev. Rul. 87-22, 1987-1 C.B. 146
(interpreting language in H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1975), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2887, 2996). The Service narrowly construed language in the legislative
history allowing deductions for points paid only on loans to purchase and improve principal
residences, and for no other purpose, as not authorizing a deduction for points paid to
refinance any loan originally entered into in connection with the purchase or improvement
of a principal residence. See id. The Tax Court has agreed with the Service, see Huntsman
v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 917 (1988), but the Eighth Circuit disagreed, at least on the facts
of the case, see Huntsman v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1990).
1991-921
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this point, Senator Gramm was correct. He then said the principle
of the proposed amendment limiting residence interest to loans
used for certain purposes but not others is similar to the principle
of the provision related to points. 62 More importantly, he said the
"enforcement procedure [was] basically the same, requiring the
person who claims the credit to demonstrate what the credit is
being used for, to, in fact, prove that the interest payment is
coming about as a result of an effort to buy a home, to improve
the home, or for these two other minor purposes." 63 No more was
said about the possible administrative problems.
Administratively, tracing points is simpler than tracing recur-
ring interest payments on a note. Home purchasers pay points at
the date of loan proceeds receipt so that the homeowner traces the
points to the use of the proceeds in the year of deduction. In
contrast, interest is deducted in years after the original borrowing.
Thus, intervening events can blur the determination of how the
loan proceeds initially were used. Tracing the use of proceeds in
determining the proper treatment of points is simplified because
the only qualifying use is the acquisition or improvement of a
principal residence that is usually purchased and pledged in one
integrated transaction with the payment of points. A homeowner,
however, is allowed to use proceeds of qualified residence loans
for educational and health purposes, uses not so easily traced.
The Treasury's 1987 proposed temporary regulations6 illustrate
the administrative problems that could arise. First, the regulations
allocated interest based on the taxpayer's use of the proceeds of
the underlying debt. The regulations required the taxpayer to pay
qualified medical or educational expenses within ninety days before
or after the date the money actually was borrowed.6 5 Additionally,
under the general interest allocation regulations," the proceeds of
the underlying debt could not have been allocated to any other
expenses, and the proceeds of any other debt could not have been
allocated to the medical or educational expenses. 67 Alternatively,
the taxpayer could show that the interest was allocable to qualified
62 See 132 CoNo. REc. S7391 (daily ed. June 12, 1986) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
63 See id. at S7391 (The two minor purposes were medical care and education.).
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1OT(n) (1987); see also T.D. 8168, 1988-1 C.B. 80.
65 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-IOT(n)(2)(i)(A).
- See id. The general interest allocation rules are set out in Temp. Treas. Reg. §
1.163-8T (1987).
67 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(n)(2)(i)(A).
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medical or educational expenses. 8 If a taxpayer used at least ninety
percent of the proceeds of a secured debt to pay for. qualified
medical or educational expenses, the regulations effectively treated
the entire debt as being spent for qualified purposes.6 9 If more
than ten percent of the proceeds of a loan were not used for
qualified medical or educational purposes, the regulations required
the taxpayer to treat the lesser of the average balance of the
outstanding debt during the year, or the amount of the proceeds
actually used for the qualified purposes, as qualifying debt.70 Fi-
nally, the regulations required repayments on mixed-use debt to be
applied first to reduce the amount of the debt allocated to the
qualified medical or educational use.71
- See id. § 1.163-10T(n)(2)(i)(B).
See id. § 1.163-1OT(n)(1)(ii).
- See id. §l.163-10Yr(n)(1)(iii).
71 See id. § 1.163-10T(n)(1)(iii). Although the statute has changed and the regulations
may not ever be tested, it seems that the regulations' requirement that payments of principal
be applied against the part of the debt attributable to a qualified use rather than against
that part of the debt attributable to other uses contradicts the general interest allocation
rules. The general allocation rules allocate debt repayments first to personal expenditures.
See id. Personal expenditures are defined as expenditures that are not trade or business
expenditures, passive activity expenditures, or investment expenditures. See Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.163-8T(b)(5). Thus, it appears that qualified residence expenditures, including
qualified medical and educational expenditures, are treated as personal expenditures for the
repayment regulations. Since the debt repayment regulations do not specify a category for
qualified residence expenditures, the regulations could, and probably should, be interpreted
to allocate debt principal repayments to the debt for which the taxpayer would get the least
favorable tax treatment, and treat as remaining outstanding the debt for which the taxpayer
receives the most favorable treatment. For example, the debt repayment regulations allocate
payments first to personal expenditures so that the debt deemed satisfied first is the debt
on which the taxpayer receives no deduction. Second, the repayments are allocated to
investment and passive activity expenditures (other than rental real estate activities), which
qualify for interest deductions that may be deducted only when the taxpayer has investment
or passive activity income. The third category, rental real estate activity, qualifies for some
deduction currently even if the activity records a loss during the year, depending on the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 469(i) (1988). The fourth and fifth categories,
former passive activity expenditures and trade or business expenditures, progressively favor
taxpayer's current interest deductibility. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(d).
A second reason that repayments of mixed-use debt should be allocated first to personal
use is that the general interest allocation regulations provide that amounts repaid are
allocated on a first expended basis. See id. Thus, partial repayment of a loan that was used
first for purely personal purposes with the remainder of the loan proceeds then expended
for qualified residence interest debt would be applied against the part of the loan used for
purely personal purposes. See id. § 1.163-ST(d)(2), (c)(4)(ii) (example). A taxpayer should
be able, therefore, to show the order of use of proceeds under the general interest allocation
regulations rather than be subject to the irrebuttable presumption rules of the debt repayment
rules. Under the general interest allocation rules, a taxpayer that expends money from a
loan on two separate transactions on the same day may allocate debt repayments by treating
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The qualified residence interest provision that Congress enacted
in 1986 broadly defined qualified residence interest as any interest
paid or accrued during the taxable year on indebtedness secured
by a qualified residence of the taxpayer at the time the interest is
paid or accrued. 72 The section quickly limited the amount of oth-
erwise qualified residence interest by disallowing a deduction for
interest on any part of the underlying indebtedness to the extent it
exceeded the lesser of the fair market value of the qualified resi-
dence or the taxpayer's basis in the qualified residence, including
the cost of any improvements, plus the aggregate amount of qual-
ified medical and qualified educational indebtedness. 73
B. Revenue Act of 1987
1. Perceived Flaws in the 1986 Act
Only one year after introducing the concept, Congress redefined
qualified residence interest in the Revenue Act of 1987 ("the 1987
Act"). 74 The legislative history is sparse, but it indicates that the
1987 Act may have been drafted to work at cross purposes. The
House Committee was concerned that the 1986 Act had not achieved
its stated purpose of "encouraging home ownership while limiting
significant disincentives to saving."' 75 The stated objection was that
the 1986 Act provision allowed interest deductions on loans secured
by the taxpayer's residence even when the loan bore no relation to
the acquisition or improvement of the residence. 76 The 1986 Act,
according to the 1987 Act's legislative history, permitted interest
the underlying debt as occurring in any order. See id. § 1.163-8T(d)(2); see also id. § 1.163-
8T(c)(4)(v) (stating that simultaneously incurred debts may be treated as incurred in any
order the taxpayer selects).
72 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, 100 Stat. at 2248. Qualified residence was defined to
include two residences: the taxpayer's principal residence and one other residence of the
taxpayer. The taxpayer could not choose his principal residence but could select which other
residence was a qualified residence. See id.
71 See id. at 2247. Qualified medical and qualified educational indebtedness had to be
secured by a qualified residence, and the homeowner had to pay for qualified medical and
qualified educational expenses within a reasonable time after incurring the indebtedness.
See id.
, See 101 Stat. at 1330-384 to -386 (codified at I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)).
71 H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., pt 2, at 1031 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-378, 2313-647.
76 See id.
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deductions on borrowings for general purposes in excess of amounts
justified to encourage home ownership."
The legislative history offers no specific example of perceived
abuses, but the ability to use home equity to finance qualified
medical and qualified educational expenditures3 does not seem to
be the culprit. Nor does the limitation79 that interest can be de-
ducted on loans only up to the fair market value of the qualified
residence. The potential for magnifying interest deductions appears
to be centered on the homeowner's ability to deduct interest on
loan amounts up to the homeowner's basis in a qualified resi-
dence.80 Restricting qualifying loans to the basis of the residence
carried out Congress' intention to allow deductions for the pur-
chase and improvement of a residence or for qualified medical and
educational loans as long as the loan approximated the homeown-
er's basis in the residence. On the other hand, the homeowner that
reduced the original mortgage could borrow until the total debt
equalled the basis in the home and deduct the full interest on the
loans. The homeowner could use the loan proceeds for any pur-
pose, including personal purposes. As long as the homeowner
pledged a qualified residence to secure the loan and the total dollar
amount of outstanding loans secured by the qualified residence did
not exceed the homeowner's basis in the qualified residence, the
homeowner was entitled to an interest deduction.
To illustrate, assume a homeowner purchased his only residence
for $250,000. He paid $25,000 cash from savings and borrowed
$225,000 from a lending institution, pledging the residence to secure
the debt. Congress intended to allow the purchaser to deduct the
interest paid on the purchase mortgage. If, a year later, the hom-
eowner grants a second mortgage on the home for a $25,000 loan
to buy a fur coat, fishing boat, or yacht, the homeowner under
the wording of the 1986 Act still qualified for an interest deduction
because the two loans did not exceed the homeowner's basis in the
" See id. At that time, lending institutions were advertising home equity loans.
Ironically, the advertising of home equity loans for tax savings 'prior to the 1986 Act led
to the narrowing of loans qualifying for the qualified residence interest deductions in 1986.
See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. Predictably, lending institutions emphasized
tax savings in advertising home equity loans even after the 1987 revisions and will likely
continue to do so as long as potential homeowners receive a tax break by using their home
equity to secure a loan.
73 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, 100 Stat. at 2247.
"See id.
0The loan amount was limited to the basis of the qualified residence. See id. Basis
included cost adjusted by cost of improvements. See id.
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residence. To continue the example, assume the taxpayer paid off
the first mortgage completely in past years. According to the 1986
Act, he now could borrow $250,000 for purely personal purposes
unrelated to the residence and unrelated to medical or educational
purposes while still qualifying for the interest deduction as long as
he pledged the residence to secure the loan. The greater the differ-
ence between the basis of the qualified residence and the outstand-
ing purchase mortgage, the greater the opportunities for homeowners
to deduct interest on home equity loans under the 1986 Act.
2. Acquisition Indebtedness
The 1987 Act ostensibly closed this loophole by limiting the
amount of debt qualifying for the interest deduction to the amount
of acquisition indebtedness.81 The Act defines acquisition indebt-
edness as any indebtedness incurred in acquiring, constructing, or
substantially improving any qualified residence that is secured by
the residence.12 The determination whether the debt was incurred
to acquire, construct, or improve a qualified residence is made
independently of the determination whether the debt is secured by
the qualified residence. 83 A taxpayer does not have to satisfy all
requirements at the incurring of the debt. Current defects may be
cured subsequently. The Treasury has indicated that a taxpayer
that incurs a debt in acquiring a qualified residence but does not
pledge the residence as security may pledge the residence at a later
date to secure the debt, still treating the debt as acquisition in-
debtedness.84 Similarly, a person that incurs a debt to purchase a
residence and pledges the residence to secure the debt at a time
when the property does not meet the requirements to be a qualified
residence subsequently may treat the debt as acquisition indebted-
ness if and when the property becomes a qualified residence. 5
These directives will help taxpayers that unwittingly structure a
transaction without considering the qualified residence interest pro-
visions. In a relatively high profile situation, for example, White
House Chief of Staff John Sununu reportedly borrowed $420,000,
pledging his residence in Salem, New Hampshire, to secure the
See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A).
See id. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i). Acquisition indebtedness also includes refinancing of
acquisition indebtedness. See infra text accompanying note 89.
91 See I.R.S. Notice 88-74, 1988-2 C.B. 385.
See id.
85 See id.
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debt. He used $415,000 shortly thereafter to purchase a home in
Oakton, Virginia, to serve as his principal residence while acting
as chief of staff.86 Even though Mr. Sununu realistically could
trace the loan proceeds to the acquisition of a qualified residence,
the Treasury has reminded taxpayers that debt will not qualify as
acquisition indebtedness until and unless the qualified residence
secures the debt.87 Thus, John Sununu likely will not be allowed a
deduction for interest on acquisition indebtedness until he pledges
the Oakton residence to secure the debt. The pledge probably
cannot be made retroactively. Mr. Sununu should be able to treat
$100,000 of the debt as home equity indebtedness, however, be-
cause he can elect to choose the pledged Salem home as a qualified
residence.18
Acquisition indebtedness includes refinancings, but only to the
extent the amount of the new debt does not exceed the outstanding
amount of the refinanced debt.8 9 Once a homeowner reduces the
principal on any acquisition debt, he reduces it permanently for
determining the amount of acquisition indebtedness. Therefore, a
homeowner cannot treat a subsequent borrowing against the equity
in his home as acquisition indebtedness even if he pledges the
residence as collateral. Thus, a homeowner can deduct acquisition
indebtedness interest only for the remaining part of the financed
purchase price and any financed costs of improvements, but cannot
deduct interest on any additional debt resulting from the refinanc-
ing.
To illustrate, if two taxpayers each bought a $200,000 home,
one paying cash and the other financing the full $200,000 by
granting a mortgage to secure the debt, only the second taxpayer
could deduct acquisition indebtedness interest. This would be true
even if the person paying cash had other nonbusiness debts of
$200,000 outstanding at the time, or if he later borrowed $200,000,90
pledging his residence to secure the loan. Likewise, if the taxpayer
financing the full $200,000 paid the lender $50,000 against the
" See Lee Shepard, Sununu's Tax Problems, Part II, 51 TAx NoTEs 809, 809-10
(1991) (relying on Charles Babcock & Ann Devroy, Figures Show Sununus on Tight Budget,
WASH. POST, May 11, 1991, at Al, A2).
7 See I.R.S. Notice 88-74, 1988-2 C.B. 385, 386.
0 For a discussion of home equity indebtedness see infra notes 92-104 and accom-
panying text.
Id.; see also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-ST(e).
90 The text assumes the taxpayer used the borrowed money for purposes other than
to acquire, construct, or substantially improve a qualified residence.
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principal, reducing the outstanding principal balance to $150,000,
he could not later borrow $50,000 against the home and treat the
$50,000 as reinstated acquisition indebtedness. Predictably, a tax-
payer also cannot treat borrowings against the increase in his
residence's fair market value as acquisition indebtedness.
Finally, Congress set a one million dollar maximum limit on
qualifying acquisition indebtedness to restrict the tax benefits to
high-income persons.91 Otherwise, neither the home's basis nor
changes in its fair market value is relevant in establishing the
amount of indebtedness qualifying for treatment as acquisition
indebtedness.
3. Home Equity Indebtedness
What Congress took away in limiting interest on acquisition
indebtedness, it gave back in a home equity indebtedness provi-
sion. 92 Home equity indebtedness is all debt, other than acquisition
indebtedness, secured 93 by a qualified residence to the extent the
aggregate amount of the indebtedness does not exceed the taxpay-
er's equity in the two qualified residences. 94 Home equity is deter-
mined by deducting the amount of each residence's remaining
acquisition indebtedness from its fair market value.95 Therefore, in
contrast to the 1986 Act's provision, a residence's fair market
value, not its basis, determines the maximum debt qualifying as
home equity indebtedness. The Code limits the amount of debt
qualifying as home equity indebtedness to $100,000. 96
To illustrate, continuing an example begun in the acquisition
indebtedness discussion, a taxpayer that purchases a qualified res-
' See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii); H.R. REP. No. 391, supra note 75, at 1032, reprinted
in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-648.
See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A)(ii).
' Debt will not fail to be treated as secured solely because under a state or local
homestead or other law in effect on August 16, 1986, the security interest is ineffective or
the enforceability of the security interest is restricted. See id. § 163(h). Section 163(h)
thereby allows residents in states such as Texas, where the enforceability of second mortgages
on principal residences is restricted, to treat interest on such mortgages as qualified residence
interest. See 132 CONG. REc. S13956 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1986) (colloquy between Sen.
Bentson and Sen. Packwood).
-, See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C); H.R. REP. No. 391, supra note 75, at 1033, reprinted in
1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-649. A taxpayer may have two qualified residences. One
residence is limited to the taxpayer's principal residence. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A)(i)(I). The
taxpayer selects the second qualifying residence from among residences within the meaning
of § 280A(d)(1). See id. § 163(h)(4)(A)(i)(II).
- See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i).
%See id.
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idence for $200,000, paying $50,000 cash and financing the re-
maining $150,000 purchase price, incurs acquisition indebtedness
of $150,000. This taxpayer may borrow up to $50,000 at a later
date and, by pledging the residence to secure the debt, can deduct
the interest if the fair market value of the residence remains at
least $200,000 because the residence's fair market value exceeds
the amount of the acquisition indebtedness related to the residence
by $50,000. If the fair market value of the residence increases to
$250,000, the taxpayer may borrow additional amounts against the
increased value, and, as long as the residence secures the debt, the
taxpayer may deduct the interest. The taxpayer may spend the loan
proceeds for any purpose, including personal purposes. 97 The tax-
payer does not need to trace the use of the proceeds to a statutorily
approved purpose.
Congress' allowance of a home equity indebtedness interest
deduction appears inconsistent with its stated purpose of encour-
aging home ownership without disincentives to saving.98 Congress
opted to achieve its stated purpose by allowing a deduction only
on debt incurred for the purpose of acquiring or substantially
improving a taxpayer's residence and then only if the debt was
secured by the taxpayer's residence. 99 Nevertheless, Congress felt
other policy concerns justified additional interest deductions. 1 ° The
committee report, however, did not develop this line of thought at
all. Presumably, the committee members had in mind the same
concerns voiced during the 1986 deliberations. For example, some
congressional leaders felt that taxpayers should be able to deduct
interest on loans to pay for education, health care, unforeseen
emergencies, loss of employment, or to help their parents or chil-
dren. 101 Congress' authorization of interest deductions on home
equity indebtedness, notwithstanding the homeowner's basis, lib-
eralized the amount of non-acquisition indebtedness qualifying for
interest deductions.' °2
,7 See H.R. REP. No. 391, supra note 75, at 1033, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2313-649; see also supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. John Sununu used proceeds
from a loan secured by a qualified residence to purchase another qualified residence. The
loan should not qualify as acquisition indebtedness, but could qualify in part as home
equity indebtedness.
" See H.R. REP. No. 391, supra note 75, at 1031, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2313-647.
" See id. at 1031-32, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-647 to -648.
1o0 See id. at 1032, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-648.
M See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
'* Contra Deborah Whitt, Interest Deductions After the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and
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Congress also repealed the special provision authorizing interest
deductions on loans for qualified education and medical expendi-
tures, deeming the $100,000 home equity indebtedness provision
sufficient to meet these purposes. 03 Moreover, the administrative
difficulties in ascertaining the amount of interest deductible for
educational and medical loans augered a single $100,000 cap for
all home equity indebtedness. °4
C. 1990 Tax Simplification Proposals
The 1987 Act apparently did not satisfy all people because the
staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation submitted three alter-
native simplification proposals in 1990.105 The first proposal would
group the current categories of investment interest, personal inter-
est, and qualified residence interest into one category called non-
business interest. °6 Taxpayers would be allowed to deduct a
percentage of this interest currently. °7 This first proposal would
the Revenue Act of 1987, 6 B.U. J. TAX LAw 85, 104 (1988). The difference in conclusion
between this Article and the Whitt article is that Whitt observes the effect on the taxpayer
that bought a $500,000 residence and owes only $10,000 on his mortgage. This particular
taxpayer could borrow $500,000, pledging his residence as security, paying off the $10,000
mortgage in the transaction. Under the 1987 Act only $110,000 of the new debt will qualify
for interest deduction, i.e., $10,000 acquisition indebtedness and $100,000 home equity
indebtedness. Under the 1986 Act the same taxpayer could have deducted interest on the
full $500,000 debt since the debt was no greater than the taxpayer's cost basis assuming
that the home's value was at least $500,000. In contrast, the statement in this text is based
on the majority of homeowners whose homes, though purchased in past years for less than
$100,000, have now appreciated to a value higher than cost basis. For example, a homeowner
who purchased a home ten years ago for $50,000 may have a remaining mortgage of $30,000
and a home worth $100,000. If this person borrows $100,000, pledging his residence to
secure the debt, and uses $30,000 to retire the mortgage, he can deduct interest on the full
$100,000 under the 1987 Act, i.e., $30,000 acquisition indebtedness and $70,000 home equity
indebtedness. Under the 1986 Act, the loan amount was limited to basis in the home so
that only $50,000 of the loan qualified for the interest deduction. Because more people fall
in this category than the one Whitt argues, the conclusion reached in this text-that the
1987 Act liberalizes the law by permitting a greater amount of qualified interest deductions-
seems justified.
"I See H.R. REP. No. 391, supra note 75, at 1031, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2313-648.
104 See id.
"I5 STAFF OF HOUSE COM. ON WAYS AND ME"s, 1O1sT CONG., 2D Ss., WarrraN
PROPOSAS ON TAX SimPLIFICATooN 11-13 (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter 1990 TAX SIMwP-
FicATiON PROPoSALs] (letter from Ronald Pearlman, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on
Taxation).
10, See id. at 12. Although the proposal does not discuss interest subject to the passive
activity loss provisions, presumably any statutory provision would consider interest in passive
activities to be nonbusiness interest.
,07 See id. (The proposal suggested approximately 70-75% as a revenue-neutral change.)
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not limit the deduction based on investment income. Under the
first proposal, nonbusiness interest not allowed as a deduction
would be lost, and would not be carried over to subsequent years.108
One administrative advantage of this proposal is that a taxpayer
would need only to classify interest as business or nonbusiness
rather than to classify the interest as business or as one of the
numerous nonbusiness interest subcategories now provided under
§ 163.109 Another bookkeeping advantage is that a taxpayer would
not be required to calculate investment income to determine the
current year's allowable deduction and would not need to maintain
carryover schedules for otherwise deductible interest. 10 The pro-
posal would eliminate the incentive to structure loans as home
equity loans."' Because residence mortgage interest would be
grouped into nonbusiness interest, homeowners could deduct only
a percentage of the interest. The limitation would apply equally to
interest on acquisition indebtedness and on home equity indebted-
ness.
The second proposal, like the first, groups all nonbusiness
interest together.1 2 The allowable deduction would not be based
on a percentage of interest, however, but on a maximum dollar
amount equal to a taxpayer's net investment income for the year
plus an additional dollar amount."' This approach is similar to
treatment afforded investment interest expense in prior years." 4 A
major difference is that any interest not deductible in the current
year would be lost permanently." 5 The recommendation stated that
this proposal was similar to one in the House Report in 1976,116
but it differs materially. The 1976 House Report proposed separate
lot See id.
log See id.
,o See id.
it See id.
112 See id. at 13.
3 See id. The proposal did not state a dollar amount, but based on the proposal's
reference to the 1976 House Report and to the prior § 163(d) limitations on investment
interest deduction, see Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 221, 83 Stat. 487,
574 (deduction limited to $25,000); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 209,
90 Stat. 1525, 1542 (deduction limited to $10,000), the staff member probably had in mind
a $10,000 - $25,000 amount in addition to the investment income for the year. See also
H.R. Rm. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 298 (1985) (stating that nonbusiness interest
deduction would be limited to the sum of net investment income plus $10,000, or $20,000
in case of a joint return).
"' See supra note 113; see also H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 113, at 298.
"I See 1990 TAx SPLIFICATION PRoPosALs, supra note 105, at 13.
11 See id.
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limitation guidelines for personal interest deductions and invest-
ment interest deductions, and it provided for carryover of invest-
ment interest to succeeding years if not allowable in the current
year. 117 Most likely, Congress would adopt this second alternative
only if the provision was modified to provide for investment inter-
est carryover 18 and if the amount of personal interest deductible
was sufficient to accommodate mortgage interest on residence ac-
quisition indebtedness. These modifications, of course, would run
counter to the administrative simplification results the proposals
aspire to achieve.
The third proposal bifurcates nonbusiness interest into qualified
residence interest and all other nonbusiness interest. 1 9 Qualified
residence interest would be deductible in the year paid or in-
curred. 120 Investment interest and other personal interest would be
deductible only up to investment income.' 2' Any interest not al-
lowed in the current year would be carried forward to successive
years.'2 The proposal did not define qualified residence interest
but the recommendation claimed that the alternative was similar
to a provision of the House version of the Tax Reform Act of
1986.'2 The House bill treated all iiidebtedness up to the fair
market value of two residences as qualified residence indebtedness
if the residences secured the indebtedness. 124 This provision seem-
ingly would be modified to parrot the current definition of quali-
fied residence interest or of acquisition indebtedness and provide
that personal interest not qualifying as qualified residence interest
"I See H.R. REP. No" 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 103-04 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 2998-99. Not allowing any carryover of undeducted investment interest
seems arbitrary under this proposal because a taxpayer could incur significant investment
interest expense before recognizing any income from the investment. The limitation to
investment income historically served to match income and expense rather than to dictate
the amount of interest that should be deductible in the absence of timing considerations.
See H.R REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 72 (1969), reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1718.
,It Congress might disallow carryover of personal or consumer interest. The third
alternative below, however, anticipates a carryover for all currently nondeductible interest.
119 See 1990 TAx SIMPLIFICATION PROPOsALS, supra note 105, at 13.
'2 See id. Presumably the qualified residence interest would be deductible in full,
although the report does not address whether the option could contain a percentage allow-
ance of qualified residence interest.
121 See id.
12 See id.
123 See id.
,14 See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 113, at 298-99.
[VOL. 80
MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION
would be added to and treated the same as investment interest.'15
Taxpayers would still have the same incentive to secure debt with
their residence to qualify for the current interest deduction if
qualified residence interest included both acquisition indebtedness
and home equity indebtedness.
II. THm DEBATE OVER THE HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST
DEDUCTION
A. Government Policies Encouraging Homeownership
Since the 1930s, the United States government has acted to
increase the flow of capital into the housing market and the avail-
ability of funds to home purchasers at lower interest rates. 126 The
government also has set policies geared to reducing the cost of
homeownership.' 27 For example, the government insures deposits
in savings and loans and banks to encourage deposits. As a result,
many investors are more willing to deposit money with insured
financial intermediaries at lower interest rates because of the safety
of the investment. Consequently, financial institutions have more
money to loan and should loan the money at lower rates. Until
the early 1980s, the general rule was that savings and loan associ-
ations loaned money to homebuyers while banks loaned money to
businesses. The government prevented banks from luring savings
and loan depositors by setting maximum interest rates on bank
deposits.'2 Today financial institutions loan to both homebuyers
and businesses, and savings and loan associations no longer have
government imposed advantages over banks.' 9 Government deposit
insurance still favors financial institutions over other investment
options, however. 30 Only now, the home purchaser must compete
for loans against businesses, which increases the cost of mortgages.
The federal government also insures holders of mortgages that
conform to federal guidelines.' Since the mortgage lender's risk
'M The recommendation acknowledged that some persons might question the rationale
for carrying personal interest forward to future periods. See 1990 TAx SIMPLICATION
PROPOSAIs, supra note 105, at 12.
'" See Gordon H. Sellon, Jr., The Role of Government in Promoting Homeownership:
The U.S. Experience, 75 ECON. REv. 37, 40 (July/Aug. 1990).
12 See id.
,21 Banks no longer are subject to the interest rate limitation on deposits.
129 See Sellon, supra note 126, at 42.
110 See id. at 40.
131 Id.
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of loss is minimized, the lender should accept a lower downpayment
and charge a lower interest rate. Moreover, federally insured mort-
gages are more marketable, adding flexibility for lenders and en-
couraging mobility of capital from all parts of the country to
growth regions.1 2 Other government programs, such as the Federal
Home Loan Bank System, the Federal National Mortgage Associ-
ation, the Government National Mortgage Association and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, operate to acquire
funds and loan money to institutions for home mortgages or to
purchase outstanding mortgages. 133
Congress also uses the tax laws to foster homeownership. De-
ductibility of qualified residence interest 34 is the most obvious
example. Deductibility of property taxes, 35 current deductibility of
points, 136 nonrecognition of gain on the sale of a principal residence
if a new residence is purchased, 37 complete exclusion of $125,000
from sale of a principal residence after the selling taxpayer reaches
age fifty-five,' 38 and exemption of sales of principal residence from
original issue discount rules 39 further encourage homeownership.
Some commentators say Congress' failure to tax the imputed rental
value of a residence in the income base is also a tax preference.' 40
In addition, homeowners receive some of the same tax benefits
as other investors in property. For example, a homeowner does
not recognize as taxable income the annual appreciation in the
home's fair market value until the homeowner sells the home. Even
then, the rollover provision and exclusion provision for homeown-
ers over age fifty-five delay further or even eliminate any taxable
gain. Should recognition be required from the sale of a home, the
homeowner would benefit from any capital gains preferences in
132 Id.
' See id. at 41.
-- See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (1988). Until relatively recently taxpayers could deduct all
interest so that the mortgage interest deduction was allowed with no need to evaluate the
effect on homeownership. As Congress limited interest deductibility, however, the sanctity
of home mortgage interest became both an issue and a political cry. See JEERY H.
BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULcH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS,
AND THE UNLKLY TRIUMPH OF TAX REORM 57, 116 (1987).
.35 See I.R.C. § 164(a) (1988).
-- See id. § 461(g)(2) (1988).
" See id. § 1034 (1988).
I- See id. § 121 (1988).
3 See id. § 1274(c)(3)(B) (1988).
110 See, e.g., RIcHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIUAL INCOME TAX 120-29 (1976).
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effect. 41 Homeowners can escape all income tax consequences on
value appreciation if they die owning their home because a devisee
receives a stepped up basis to the home's fair market value, with
no income tax burden to the deceased or the devisee. 142
Notwithstanding any other tax benefit related to the sale of a
principal residence, the current deduction of interest and the de-
ferred taxation, or in many cases tax exemption, of appreciation
benefits the homeowner. The homeowner can deduct the mortgage
interest currently, saving taxes or receiving refunds, while at the
same time not recognizing for tax purposes any value appreciation
on the home. If, for example, a homeowner buys a home for
$100,000, completely on a $100,000 mortgage borrowed at 10%
annual interest rate, and the home appreciates $10,000 a year, the
homeowner deducts the $10,000 interest annually but does not
report as income the home's $10,000 increase in value. A hom-
eowner can invest the taxes saved by the interest deduction and
earn money on the investment. In contrast, a person that borrows
$100,000 at 1000 interest, and puts the money in an account paying
10% interest, saves no taxes because the full $10,000 interest must
be reported in income and the interest deduction merely offsets the
interest income. 43 The homeowner that sells his home at a gain,
assuming the gain must be recognized, pays a tax only on the gain,
with no adjustment for the period of deferral. 44 The interest earned
on the tax savings for the years of appreciation results in an
economic profit to the homeowner. This ability to profit from the
deferral of income, a form of tax arbitrage, is not limited to
homeownership. It applies to all assets that may appreciate in
value. 145
141 Currently, the capital gains preference allows a taxpayer to pay tax on the gain at
a rate no greater than 28%, even if the taxpayer's marginal tax rate is greater. See I.R.C.
§ 1 (West 1988). The highest marginal tax rate currently is 31%. See id. Historically a
taxpayer could exclude 50% or 60% of net capital gains from taxable income.
Also, a taxpayer can offset gain from the sale of the home against any capital losses,
which would benefit the taxpayer because, except for $3000 annually, the taxpayer is not
allowed to deduct capital losses against any income except capital gains. See id. § 1211
(1988).
1,2 See id. § 1014 (1988). The homeowner would, in any event, be subject to estate
tax. See id.
"' See id. § 61(a)(4) (1988).
" Congress is beginning to charge interest on some income recognition deferrals, see,
e.g., id. § 453A(c) (West 1991) (pertaining to certain installment obligations), but has not
attempted to add an additional charge for postponing the realization event itself.
" See generally Eugene Steuerle, Tax Arbitrage, Inflation, and the Taxation of Interest
Payments and Receipts, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 991, 1002-06 (1984) (describing types of tax
arbitrage).
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B. The Owner's Dual Purposes for Homeownership
To limit interest deductions on residences, Congress must dis-
tinguish home acquisition from other asset acquisitions in which
interest deductions are allowed. The facial difference is that a
homeowner uses his residence for personal housing. Therefore,
analytically, the home is a personal, living, or family expense, the
deduction of which should be prohibited.'1 More precisely, the
home is an asset used for personal, living, or family activities, and
the expenses related to that personal use should be nondeductible.
Stopping here, the analysis disfavors a mortgage interest deduction.
But stopping omits a critical factor: a homeowner also owns the
home as an investment, purchasing and holding the home with the
reasonable expectation that it will appreciate in value. The gains
are not tax-exempt. 47 Certainly, most taxpayers can postpone tax-
ation by purchasing higher priced homes and effectively can avoid
recognizing any gains by holding their homes until death. As to
the latter option, however, taxpayers escape income taxation on
any asset held until death. Homes stand on no different footing
than would rental property, stocks, or business assets. As far as
not immediately recognizing a taxed gain on sale, the effective
result is not much different from that expected by taxpayers that
buy investment property or business property with no intention of
disposing of the property in a taxable transaction.' 48 If a taxpayer
can deduct interest expense on loans to hold other investment
property, then the taxpayer should be able to deduct the interest
to acquire a home.
The § 183 regulations recognize this dual purpose of ownership
in non-principal residence situations. Section 183 limits deductions
incurred in activities not engaged in for profit. 49 The limitation
applies separately to each activity not engaged in for profit.'50 The
§ 183 regulations state that when a taxpayer purchases or holds
land primarily with the intent to profit from the increase in the
-- See id. § 262(a) (1988).
14 A taxpayer can elect to exclude up to $125,000 of gain from the sale of a home
used as the taxpayer's principal residence for three of the five years immediately preceding
the date of sale if the taxpayer is at least age 55 at date of sale. See id. § 121; supra note
138 and accompanying text. The election can only be made once by a taxpayer and his
spouse. See I.R.C. § 121.
I" They expect to hold the property until death, or transfer to a controlled corporation,
or use in business as long as the business operates, or trade in a like-kind exchange.
" See I.R.C. § 183(a) (1988). The § 183 limitations do not apply to for profit activities.
,so See id.
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land's value, and the taxpayer also farms the land, the farming
and the holding of the land will be considered a single activity
only if the income from the farming exceeds the deductions not
directly attributable to the holding of the land.'51 Otherwise, farm-
ing the land will be considered a separate activity from holding the
land as an investment. The regulations list mortgage interest, an-
nual property taxes, and depreciation as examples of deductions
directly attributable to holding of the land.152 The same can be
said of homeownership. Certain expenses incurred to support the
use of the home as a residence should be denied, and expenses
incurred to purchase or hold the property as an investment should
be treated the same as other investment expenses.' 53
Currently the Code does not bifurcate homeownership into its
personal and investment components, looking instead to the tax-
payer's primary motive for purchasing the home. In nearly all
cases, if a homeowner lives in a home for any length of time, the
Service and most courts will find the primary motive for purchasing
to have been for the personal purpose of using it as a residence. 154
"I See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(d)(1) (1972).
"'2 See id. The § 262 regulations lean in this direction by denying the expenses of
maintaining a household, which the regulations enumerate as "amounts paid for rent, water,
utilities, domestic service, and the like." See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3) (as amended in
1972). In a separate paragraph the § 262 regulations disallow a deduction for insurance on
an owner-occupied residence. See id. § 1.262-1(b)(2). The regulations do not deny interest,
property taxes, and depreciation. The regulations lend credence to evaluating expenses on
the home by allocating the expenses to the current residential use and to the holding of the
home as an investment. It may be presumptuous to read too much into the § 262 regulations,
however. The regulations cross reference to other sections specifically dealing with interest
and taxes. See id. § 1.262-1(c). Therefore, the regulations might be read as intentionally
avoiding any reference to items discussed by more specific provisions. The § 262 regulations
do recognize a vertical separation if part of the home is used for business. See id. § 1.262-
l(b)(3). All that remains is for the Treasury or Congress to recognize the need to recognize
a separation between current use and gain on disposition.
" Currently, a taxpayer can deduct investment interest, although the deduction may
be deferred until a future period. See I.R.C. § 163(d) (1988). Additionaly, an investor can
deduct depreciation on rental real estate. See id. § 167(a) (1988). Congress could change
the law to deny all investment interest deduction and all depreciation on real estate. The
analysis in text does not carry over to other consumer assets. For example, a person
normally purchases and finances an automobile for personal use with no reasonable expec-
tation that the automobile itself will be sold for a profit. Land is the major exception.
'14 See, e.g., Austin v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1962). In Austin, the
taxpayer put his house up for sale within one week after moving into the house. See id. at
586. The taxpayer and his family lived in the house for three years before selling it for a
loss. The Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's factual holding that the home was
purchased primarily for a residence. See id. The Second Circuit rejected the taxpayer's legal
argument that a profit motive is all that is necessary and that the Tax Court should not
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Ironically, Congress, by allowing mortgage interest deductions and
property tax deductions, has de facto bifurcated the significant
homeownership expenses, specifically allowing those normally as-
sociated with holding the home for investment and denying those
associated with current residential use. To complete the dichotomy,
Congress would need only determine if depreciation should be
deemed a personal expense requiring basis reduction without tax
effect "'55 and whether some expenses, such as insurance on the
home, are properly considered a current personal expenditure or a
cost of protecting the investment.
As a policy-making maxim, Congress and the Treasury should
recognize the dual purposes of owning a home: holding for the
personal use as a residence and the holding as an investment.
Expenses relating to the holding as an investment would be de-
ductible as with any other investment, and expenses attributable to
personal use would be nondeductible.
Interest to purchase the home would be deductible as invest-
ment interest. Remaining as an issue would be whether this mort-
gage interest would be deductible in full currently or subject to the
interest investment limitations. 5 6 Current deductibility without lim-
itation to investment income seems appropriate because Congress
wants to promote homeownership. Many persons' homes are their
only investment, especially in the first few years of ownership. The
investment interest deduction limitation effectively would foreclose
home mortgage interest deductions for the very persons that need
them most.
have inquired into primary and secondary motives. See id. at 584. The Second Circuit held
that either I.R.C. § 262 or I.R.C. § 165 (1954) applied, determined as a function of the
dominant or primary motive for acquiring the residence. See Austin, 298 F.2d at 584. See
also Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9 (1964) (stating that loss sustained on the sale of residential
property purchased or constructed by the taxpayer for his personal residence and so used
by him up to the time of the sale is not deductible). The regulations allow the taxpayer to
take a loss if prior to sale the taxpayer rents out the home or otherwise uses it for income-
producing purposes. See id.
I It would seem appropriate to deny depreciation deductions no matter the ultimate
resolution of the bifurcation issue. If depreciation is considered personal, no deduction
follows from § 262. If, on the other hand, depreciation is not considered personal, then no
depreciation should be allowed because the taxpayer would be holding the home for sale
instead of placing it in service. Although § 167 allows depreciation expense of property held
for production of income, allowing a depreciation deduction on an asset not producing
income currently is contrary to the matching principle and goes against the current trend
of delaying deductions until the taxpayer recognizes income or disposes of the activity or
asset. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 469 (West 1988) (passive loss limitations).
116 See id. § 163(d) (limiting investment interest deductibility).
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C. The Theories for Denying Home Mortgage Interest
Deduction
1. Denial of Home Mortgage Interest Deduction As a Substitute
for Imputing Rental Income
Opponents of the home mortgage interest deduction emphasize
the homeowner's use of the home as a residence. Their analysis is
not based on the personal use in and of itself, but instead on the
owner-occupier's rent free use of the home.' 57 According to the
argument, conceptually the owner-occupier should impute the
home's rental value as income. Because imputing rental value into
income is administratively impractical, a reasonable substitute would
be to deny deductions for all expenses related to the home, includ-
ing mortgage interest.
The nationwide imputed rental income of owner occupied re-
sidences composes a substantial portion of the gross national prod-
uct (GNP). The Department of Commerce included in the 1987
GNP 317 billion dollars as the annualized rental value of owner
occupied housing, which was approximately seven percent of
GNP.5 8 To place the amount in perspective, the imputed value of
owner occupied housing contributed more to the 1987 GNP than
did all wholesaling activities 59 and was only ten percent less than
the amount of food Americans purchased for off-premises con-
sumption.' 60 The sheer magnitude of the value of owner-occupied
-' An early proponent of taxing the imputed rent itself was Professor Henry Simons.
See HENRY C. SmoNs, PERSONAL INcomE TAXATiON 112-19 (1938). Simons noted that other
countries such as England, Germany, and Australia taxed imputed rent. See id. at 112 n.3,
117. The step to denying expenses of homeownership, including mortgage interest, in lieu
of taxing imputed rents, follows as an indirect method of taxing imputed rents. See JOSEPH
M. DODGE, THE LoGic oF TAX 151 (1989). The rent free notion is misleading to the extent
that the owner incurs any additional expenses that would have been borne by a landlord if
the taxpayer had been renting. Maintenance, repairs, insurance, water, sewer, property
taxes, and garbage collection are some expenses homeowners incur that many renters do
not pay directly. Only the property taxes are deductible for federal income tax purposes.
See I.R.C. § 164(a).
I' See U.S. BUREAU O1 THE CENsus, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TM UNITED STATES:
1989, at 426 (109th ed. 1989) (Table No. 693: Personal Consumption Expenditures, By
Type of Expenditure in Current Dollars: 1980 - 1987). The GNP for 1987 was
$4,526,700,000,000. See id. at 422 (Table No. 686: Gross National Product, By Industry,
In Current and Constant (1982) Dollars: 1980 - 1987).
,M Wholesale trade in 1987 contributed 313 billion dollars to GNP. See id. at 422
(Table 686: Gross National Product, By Industry, In Current and Constant (1982) Dollars:
1980 - 1987).
160 See id. at 426 (Table No. 693. Personal Consumption Expenditures, By Type of
Expenditure in Current Dollars: 1980 - 1987).
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housing invites taxation. Its inclusion in the GNP calculation seems
to indicate possible accurate valuation.
If the homeowner imputed rental income, the homeowner would
deduct against that imputed income the same expenses allowable
to persons owning rental property. 161 Imputing rental income from
homeownership likely will not occur in the United States. Many
countries have taxed the imputed value, 62 but currently govern-
ments are moving away from taxing the imputed rent. 63
As a substitute for taxing imputed rental income, some advo-
cate denying interest deductions. For this theory to prevail, imputed
rental income must be income under the tax laws, not just income
under economists' definition, and interest must be rationally related
to the imputed income, to justify denying the deduction as a
substitute for imputing rental income. The current tax framework
argues against imputing rental value into the income base. If in-
come included imputed rent for owner occupied housing, income
would include the fair rental value of all consumer goods, such as
automobiles, furniture, appliances, or boats, and would include
the value of services performed by the taxpayer for the taxpayer's
personal benefit, such as yard work, housework, raising own chil-
dren, driving own car, or growing a garden. The current tax laws
reach none of these. Likewise, the tax laws do not tax a taxpayer
"I Traditionally, those expenses would include interest paid on indebtedness incurred
to acquire or improve the residence. Under this approach, many taxpayers would report
annual taxable incomes from home ownership, especially if or when the taxpayer reduced
the outstanding principal balance on the acquisition mortgage. Others, especially persons in
the first few years after purchasing a home, would report losses from home ownership, but
the losses would be less than the current reduction in income created by deducting interest
and property taxes while not including imputed rent as income. Instead of requiring
homeowners to impute gross rental value and supporting all deductions or subjecting the
deductions to maximum limits, the Treasury could require homeowners to impute fair rental
value by multiplying the homes' assessed value by a standard rate to determine a reasonable
net rental value. See Melvin I. White & Anne White, Horizontal Inequality in the Federal
Income Tax Treatment of Homeowners and Tenants, 18 NAT'L TAx J. 225, 231 (1965). The
Treasury could design tables, similar to the current tax tables or the once popular sales tax
tables, denoting fair rental value for a range of assessed values. The assessed value could
come from the local state or county tax assessor's office if the Treasury deems the assessment
process legitimate, or the Treasury could have its own assessors. Information forms from
the assessor to the taxpayer and federal government would alleviate the information access
problem. The standard rate would be designed to approximate net rental income after an
allowance for all expenses of owning the home except interest and perhaps real property
taxes.
,a See Paul E. Merz, Foreign Income Tax Treatment of the Imputed Rental Value of
Owner-Occupied Housing: Synopsis and Commentary, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 435, 436-37 (1977).
,63 See id. at 435 (noting that in the past decade Germany ceased taxing imputed rent).
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on the value of services of a nonworking spouse or on the value
of leisure activities. Of all these possibilities, the commentators
defend taxing only the owner-occupied housing. 64
Even limiting the inquiry solely to real property would require
an expanded imputed income base, however. Persons benefiting
from rent-control laws, for example, enjoy imputed income of the
difference between the market rental rate and the controlled rent
payments. The rental value of all vacation or second homes should
be included for the same reasons as given for the inclusion of the
rental value of the principal residence. Carried to its logical end,
the rental value of all personal use and investment real property
should be included in the tax base, even if the property is raw land
or otherwise unrented, because the taxpayer still enjoys the right
to use the property for personal purposes. 65
The imputed rent analysis rests on a recognition that a person
enjoys owned property. Ownership of that property itself means
that owner has more assets and more ability to pay than a person
that has no assets but works and spends all earnings on current
consumption. Yet, the two may have the same income for tax
purposes; Perhaps Congress should incorporate a wealth tax into
the income tax, but it has not done so. The federal government
has not chosen to do so yet and should not depart from past
practice by beginning with the home. As long as Congress excludes
imputed income, including imputed rents, from the basic definition
of income, no reasonable substitute is needed or proper, including
denying interest on the purchase of a home. 66
16 The commentators quickly exclude the value of self-performed services due to
potential administrative difficulties. Commentators accept excluding the imputed rental value
of all consumer goods except owner-occupied housing from the income base either because
the rental value is de minimis or because the assets involved are so evenly distributed
throughout the population.
163 Imputation of the rental value of real estate should extend beyond consumer owned
property to include all real estate used for business purposes. In many instances the taxpayer
would be allowed an offsetting rent deduction. In some cases the rental expense would be
capitalized in inventory or other constructed assets. Deductions related to an asset may be
denied totally because the asset is an entertainment facility, for example. See I.R.C. §
274(a)(1), (g) (1988). Congress might decide against allowing any offsetting rent deduction.
'6 Other reasons support no imputation. For example, Congress attempts to minimize
the paperwork and other complexities of the tax laws for the average person. Usually the
more complex or detailed requirements apply to persons in sophisticated situations or in
trades or businesses. Congress should not require unsophisticated homeowners to compre-
hend imputed rental income on their own home. Imputing income also should be avoided
because of the effect imputation would have on many retired persons. A major benefit of
home ownership once the mortgage has been satisfied is that the owner pays only property
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If Congress extends the income tax laws to tax imputed rents,
it must then determine that denial of mortgage interest would be
a reasonable substitute for imputing the income directly. The fas-
cination with interest is that the amount of interest most persons
pay in the initial years of ownership approximates the rent the
homeowner would pay by renting a similar house. The relationship
is not a universal one, however. Over time, homes tend to appre-
ciate in value while interest payments fall due to mortgage reduc-
tion. The correlation between interest payments and the rental value
of owner-occupied homes is too attenuated and random to form a
valid basis for a taxing surrogate.167
2. Denial of Home Mortgage Interest Deduction As an Expense
Allocable to Tax-Exempt Income
A second argument for denying home mortgage interest deduc-
tions extends to homeownership the tax tenet that no expense
allocable to tax-exempt income should be deductible.s For this
theory to prevail, imputed rent must be income for income tax
purposes. Then, because the Treasury and Congress have never
attempted to tax imputed rents to homeowners, this line of reason-
ing characterizes the imputed rental income as tax-exempt income.
Once the analysis reaches this point, the theory would deny the
taxpayer all expenses related to the home, including mortgage
interest and property taxes.169
taxes, insurance, repairs and utilities but not any principal or interest payments. Many
retired persons may have little more income than their social security payments. Some will
have pension benefits and income from savings. For whatever reasons, many retired persons
have fixed incomes and would be hard pressed to pay additional income taxes without
additional cash income. Under a wherewithal-to-pay theory, Congress should exempt retired
persons from imputing rental income.
,67 A related argument that denying interest deduction results in horizontal inequity is
developed at infra notes 187-227 and accompanying text.
'- Cf. I.R.C. § 265 (1988) (disallowing expenses and interest relating to tax-exempt
income). The disallowance of interest incurred to hold bonds paying tax-exempt interest has
been criticized as ineffective, aithough understandable, tax policy. See, e.g., Alan Gunn, Is
an Interest Deduction for Personal Debt a Tax Expenditure, 1 CAN. TAx. 46, 47 n.9 (Winter
1979). Because bonds normally have a fixed redemption amount, Congress has not there
needed to address the dual motive that exists in homeownership where the asset is held
partly for tax-exempt income production (imputed rents) and partly for taxable income
production (gains on sale of residence).
169 Professor Dodge argues that the theory would not disallow property tax deductions
because property taxes are not personal consumption and do not add to the property's
income-producing capacity. See DODGE, supra note 157, at 151. To be consistent with this
view, property tax would be an itemized deduction rather than a deduction against income
from the activity or property involved.
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Aesthetically, the tax-exempt income theory surpasses the the-
ory of denying interest as a substitute for taxing imputed rent, but
it suffers from the same malady as the substitution theory because
it assumes that imputed rent is income.170 Section 61 defines gross
income as all income from whatever source derived,171 yet, never
has the term "income" been interpreted to include imputed rents
to the owners of homes or other consumer goods. 172 Were Congress
to change § 61 to include imputed rental income, some explanation
of its divergence from tradition would be required.
Even if Congress legislates imputed rents to be considered
income and treats that income as tax-exempt, it then must take the
next step of expanding § 265171 to deny a deduction for interest on
imputed rents. If Congress in the first instance wants to treat
imputed rents as tax-exempt income specifically to deny the home
mortgage interest deduction, it will do so, and easily could disallow
all related expenses attributable to tax-exempt income without strong
theoretical opposition. One indication that Congress might be un-
willing to move in this direction, however, is its addition in 1986
of a provision specifically forbidding the Treasury from denying
interest deductions on mortgages just because the taxpayer received
a tax-exempt military housing allowance or parsonage allowance. 7 4
This attitude could change suddenly, of course.
Denying home mortgage interest deduction on tax-exempt im-
puted rents creates certain questions. 17 5 For example, would a hom-
eowner be able to deduct interest and other expenses in excess of
the tax-exempt imputed income? In the early years of ownership
the homeowner will pay out significantly more than the rental
value-of the home. If imputed rental is treated as income for tax
purposes, the natural consequence would be to disallow only the
amount of deductions up to the amount of the imputed income.
,M' For a discussion of whether imputed rental income is income for tax purposes, see
supra notes 157-167 and accompanying text.
171 See I.R.C. § 61.
'1 See MAnviw A. CumnmsmN, FEDm a. INCOmE TAxATioN 1.03 (5th ed. 1988).
Rental value of owner occupied homes and other imputed income would be income under
the Haig-Simons formula, of course. See SimoNs, supra note 157, at 110-24.
I- See I.R.C. § 265(a) (1988).
,14 See id. § 265(a)(6). In Rev. Rul. 83-3, 1983-1 C.B. 72, the Treasury denied a pro
rata share of a minister's interest deduction because the minister's parsonage allowance was
tax-exempt income. The 1986 Act overruled that decision.
171 Other problems related to the wisdom of not allowing a deduction are addressed
later. Only the accounting problems are addressed at this point.
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In Revenue Ruling 83-3, 176 for example, the Treasury indicated that
the purpose of § 265 is to prevent a double tax benefit. 77 The
homeowner that is not taxed on imputed rent receives disfavored
tax benefits only to the extent that expenses are equal to or less
than the imputed rent. Expenses in excess of tax-exempt income
do not result in double deductions. Theoretically, therefore, the
excess expenses should be allowed as deductions. 78
In Revenue Ruling 83-3, the Treasury seemingly appreciated
this logic when it denied deductions only to the extent of tax-
exempt income.179 The taxpayer was allowed deductions for excess
deductible expenses. Additionally, and justifiably, the Treasury
allocated some of the tax-exempt income to nondeductible expen-
ditures such as note principal, insurance, and utilities so that the
taxpayer did not have to offset the full amount of the tax-exempt
176 1983-1 C.B. 72. Congress in the 1986 Act overruled Rev. Rul. 83-3 because the
ruling denied interest deductions to persons receiving parsonage allowances and military
housing allowances. Also addressed in the revenue ruling and not implicated by the 1986
Act are the mechanics of the denial. See id.
177 See id. (citing United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969)). Skelly Oil did
not address § 265 but did say that the tax laws should not be interpreted to allow the
"practical equivalent of double deduction." See Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. at 684 (quoting Charles
Ifeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62, 68 (1927)). If carried to its logical conclusion, this
maxim would deny taxpayers deductions for some expenses related to the holding of capital
assets or I.R.C. § 1231 (1988) assets when the tax laws allowed a deduction on net capital
gains. The double deduction in Skelly Oil was the depletion deduction. A natural gas
producer reported income from sales of natural gas annually, taking a depletion allowance
as authorized by the Code. After six years, the producer refunded $505,536 overcharges to
two customers. Pursuant to I.R.C. § 1341 it attempted to deduct the $505,536 from taxable
income in the year of refund. The Supreme Court said the producer already had reduced
taxable income by the amount of the percentage depletion allowance and therefore could
reduce income only by $366,513, which was the amount of the $505,536 refund reduced by
the percentage depletion allowance taken in prior years. Otherwise, to allow a full deduction
for the full $505,536 and an extra 27.5% of the taxable income as a percentage depletion
allowance would have put the taxpayer in a better position than if the transaction had been
properly reported originally. This differs from the revenue ruling's examples involving a
deduction not deemed the same expenditure or the reversing of a prior transaction, as was
the case in Skelly Oil, but instead arising from different transactions on a related activity.
In Skelly Oil, the deduction was a statutory percentage of income recognized and could not
have arisen except as a percentage of gross income. In the revenue ruling, on the other
hand, a minister paid $8400 to maintain a home: principal on note ($500), interest ($4000),
insurance ($400), real estate taxes ($1400), and utilities ($2100). He likely would have paid
that amount even if he received no housing allowance.
7, Because the residence would be held for the production of imputed income, the
excess deductions should be fully deductible, including repairs, maintenance, and deprecia-
tion. The excess deductions, consistent with rental activities, should be an above the line
deduction so that taxpayers could deduct the excess expenses and still take the standard
deduction.
179 See Rev. Rul. 83-3, 1983-1 C.B. 72, 73.
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income against deductible expenses. As an alternative, Congress
might allow homeowners to reduce the amount of the tax-exempt
income for expenses, such as insurance, water, garbage collection,
repairs, and maintenance,'80 normally deductible by landlords, and
deny interest and property taxes only against the excess imputed
rent.
Several related implementation problems follow under either
approach. First, to determine the limit on interest, the taxpayer
would have to ascertain the imputed rental amount, which is a
major barrier to imputing rental income to the owner-occupier in
the first instance. Second, Congress would have to decide if the
homeowner, like the landlord, would be allowed all or some of the
deductions related to the house, such as repairs, maintenance, and
depreciation."" Third, Congress would have to determine if any
resulting loss from home ownership should be deducted above the
line the same as losses from rental property ownership, or if the
homeowner must itemize deductions.
3. Denial of Home Mortgage Interest Deduction As a Personal
Expense
A more direct approach would deny all expenses related to the
home as personal expenses. Two similar but discrete theories apply.
According to the first theory, the purchase and ownership of a
home is deemed an activity not engaged in for profit pursuant to
§ 183. Under § 183, a taxpayer may deduct expenses only up to
the income from an activity as authorized in the section.8 2 The
taxpayer may not carryover any expenses not deductible in the
current year."8 3 Under the second theory, a taxpayer gets no de-
duction for any expenses related to the home because the expenses
are nondeductible personal, living, or family expenses.1' 4 Both the-
ories meet the same objection: a homeowner purchases a home
110 Utility charges for electricity and gas legitimately could be denied since these
expenses normally are borne by the tenants and likely would not be reflected in the imputed
rental value.
Congress must decide whether the homeowner would be allowed a depreciation deduc-
tion. Any treatment of the homeowner as a landlord, which imputing rental income would
do, should allow a deduction for depreciation as long as a landlord would be entitled to it.
"I Cf. Rev. Rul. 83-3, 1983-1 C.B. 72, 73 (allocating otherwise deductible and non-
deductible expenses against tax-exempt income).
2 See I.R.C. § 183(a).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(b)(l).
See I.R.C. § 262(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(2)-(4).
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both to serve as a residence and as an investment. 85 The proper
expenses to deny for the use of a home as a personal residence are
currently denied by the Code, i.e., maintenance, utilities, repairs,
and depreciation. Interest on a home mortgage is more closely
related to the cost of owning an investment and should be deduct-
ible or not as investment interest, not as a personal expense.
18 6
Thus, the personal expense theory fails.
D. Horizontal Equity Comparisons
1. Borrowers and Asset-Disposers
Some commentators, usually those favoring home mortgage
interest deductions, analyze the home mortgage interest issue using
horizontal equity principles.18 7 Under one analysis, disallowing
mortgage interest would create an inequity between taxpayers own-
ing homes subject to mortgages and those owning homes clear of
mortgages.' Disallowing an interest deduction for homeowners
that make monthly interest payments would inequitably shift the
tax burden to these homeowners, goes the argument. Without the
mortgage interest deduction, taxpayers making monthly mortgage
payments would see their tax burdens rise compared with similarly
situated homeowners without mortgages. True, disallowing the
mortgage interest deduction definitionally results in taxpayers pre-
viously taking the mortgage interest deduction having a mathemat-
ically higher taxable income and consequently a higher tax burden.
The taxpayer that paid no mortgage interest would not lose a
deduction and would not incur any change in taxable income or
tax burden. The relationship is an easy one to understand but it
does not mandate a deduction for the home mortgage interest.
Advocates argue that the distinction does make a difference,
however. A typical scenario 8 9 put forth compares two homebuyers
equally situated. Each has assets worth $200,000. Each buys an
$80,000 home. A, an asset-disposer, disposes of $80,000 in assets
, See supra notes 146-156 and accompanying text.
15 See supra notes 148-153 and accompanying text,
"1 See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 168; see infra note 189; see infra note 197.
I" See, e.g., Melvin I. White & Anne White, Tax Deductibility of Interest on Consumer
Debt, 5 Pua. FIN. Q. 3, 5 (1977).
I' The example used here is taken from Carl S. Shoup, Deduction of Homeowners'
Mortgage Interest, Interest on Other Consumer Debt, and Property Taxes, Under the
Individual Income Tax: The Horizontal Equity Issue, 27 CAN. TAX J. 529, 530 (1979).
[VOL. 80
MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION
and pays cash for the home. B, a borrower, borrows the full
$80,000 at 10% interest. The scenario continues by assuming the
taxpayers earn 10% on their assets, other than on the home, and
that the income is taxed. After the home purchase, A and B each
have a net worth of $200,000, the same as before buying the homes,
with an altered investment mix. 1 0 A makes $12,000 income on his
$120,000 of income-producing assets. The full $12,000 is taxed. B
makes $20,000 on his $200,000 of income-producing assets. If B
does not deduct mortgage interest, B's taxable income is $20,000,
which is $8000 more than A's taxable income. If, on the other
hand, B can deduct mortgage interest, A and B both have $12,000
taxable income. The conclusion drawn is that A and B should
report the same amount of taxable income. 191
Unfortunately, the examples are misleading. The assumptions
underlying the examples lead to the results. Changes in the hypo-
thetical change the results. As an illustration, assume the taxpayer
pays a higher interest rate (10%) on the mortgage than he receives
on the income-producing asset (7%). A would have $8400 taxable
income while B would have $14,000 taxable income if mortgage
interest is nondeductible and $6000 taxable income ($14,000 income
less $8000 interest deduction) if the interest is deductible. Allowing
the mortgage interest in this situation discriminates against A, the
asset-disposer. In this scenario allowing an interest deduction favors
debtors over savers or other persons having capital. Any adjust-
ment in the hypothetical' 92 affects the degree of horizontal equity
resulting from interest deductibility. 93
11o A owns a home worth $80,000 and other assets worth $120,000. B owns a home
worth $80,000, which is offset by indebtedness of $80,000, and other assets worth $200,000.
M9 See Shoup, supra note 189, at 530.
9 For simplicity, all comparisons assume that the initially owned assets do not appre-
ciate in value. If, contrary to that assumption, the assets do appreciate in value, then B,
the borrower, economically benefits more than A, the asset-disposer, because B retains
$80,000 more assets. B benefits even more because that appreciation escapes taxation until
B disposes of the assets in a recognition event.
9 For example, if inflation is 7%, the rate of return on income-producing assets 8%,
appreciation on homes 9%, and the mortgage interest rate 10%, then A, the asset-disposer,
recognizes $9600 in income during the year and $7200 in gain after holding the home one
year for a total taxable income from the transaction of $16,800. Meanwhile, B, the borrower,
has $16,000 in income the first year and $1600 gain from the sale of the home after one
year for a total taxable income of $17,600 if the pure interest is nondeductible but the
inflation adjustment component is added to basis. If the borrower deducts the $2400 pure
interest component, $8000 less $5600, borrower's taxable income from the transaction falls
to $15,200. In neither situation do the borrower and asset-disposer have the same taxable
income. The premise of the scenario, that persons borrowing to buy homes have sufficient
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Decisionmaking based on the horizontal equity arguments be-
tween asset-disposers and borrowers should be discouraged. A more
direct recognition that new homeowners spend a substantial portion
of their income on their mortgage payments offers a more com-
pelling basis for allowing the deduction. Congress' desire to en-
courage Americans to buy homes or to help those that want to
own a home is sufficient justification for easing the financial stress
of paying mortgage interest with after-tax dollars.
2. Borrowers and Savers
If any horizontal equity analysis is done, perhaps the relevant
comparison should be between persons that have saved' 94 to buy a
home and those that have not saved or that buy a home before
saving. Home mortgage interest deductibility favors debtors over
savers. Savers must pay taxes on the earnings on savings so that
money accrues only on after-tax dollars. For example, a taxpayer
that intends to save $10,000 a year from wages must earn $15,540
to invest after-tax dollars of $10,000.195 Out of $15,540 in wages
this taxpayer would pay $1189 in social security taxes and $4351
in income taxes, leaving $10,000 for savings. In addition, the
interest earned on savings is subject to tax. Thus, for example, the
taxpayer that earns $700 interest on $10,000 for a full year retains
only $504. The other $196 must be paid as federal income taxes.
Assuming further that the taxpayer intended to purchase a $90,000
home that was increasing in value at an 8% rate, the home's value
after one year has increased to $97,200. Because of the increase in
the home's value, the taxpayer that earned over $16,00096 in wages
and interest and nets $10,504 toward the purchase of the home
needs $86,696 more to buy the home. This amount is only $3304
less than the taxpayer needed to buy the same house at the begin-
ning of the year. In the interim period, the saver, in contrast to
the borrower, may also have to pay rent.
assets to purchase a home outright is unrealistic. More likely, persons buying homes have
income from savings significantly smaller than their mortgage interest payments. In most
cases the mortgage payments come from wages.
1" Persons may inherit money or receive money as gifts from parents or other relatives
to buy a home. The discussion in this paragraph does not consider these homebuyers.
19, This statement assumes a married taxpayer that is an employee and earns less than
$53,000. This taxpayer would be subject to social security taxes of 7.65%0, see I.R.C. §
3101 (1988), and income taxes at 28% marginal rate. See id. § 1. The example excludes
state and local tax laws, which would exacerbate the bias between savers and borrowers.
"I The calculations above required the taxpayer to earn $15,540 in wages and $700
interest for a total of $16,240.
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In comparison, assume a borrower in the same economic situ-
ation as the saver buys a home for $90,000, borrowing the full
amount. Under the terms of the mortgage, the borrower must pay
$9000 a year in interest and $1000 for property taxes. The borrower
still owes the same amount of social security taxes on the $15,540
wages. The borrower deducts interest and property taxes so that
the borrower's federal income tax liability is $1551, leaving the
borrower with $2800. The borrower that deposits this amount in
an interest bearing account earns an extra $196, of which $141
remains after income taxes. Even if the borrower does not reduce
the principal balance on the mortgage, as long as the home in-
creased in value the same amount as the home in the saver example
above, the borrower's net worth increased $10,141, significantly
more than did the saver's.
The horizontal equity analysis between borrower and saver does
not lead inexorably to the conclusion that mortgage interest de-
duction be denied, however. It indicates that the tax laws favor
persons that incur debt to purchase the home over persons that
save to buy at a later time. The analysis may lead to a conclusion
that, instead of denying a home mortgage interest deduction, some
relief should be given to taxpayers that save to purchase a home. 197
3. Homeowners and Renters
Renters cannot deduct rent payments. Because interest pay-
ments are deductible and normally constitute the largest part of
the monthly mortgage payments, commentators have compared the
plight of renters to that of homeowners and concluded that the
interest deduction favors homeowners.1 98 The assertion seems self-
evident. A homeowner paying $700-a-month mortgage can deduct
the majority of the payment to reduce her tax liability approxi-
mately $200 a month, while a renter paying $700 a month rent
receives no tax benefit. The inequality is not as graphic as it appears
at first blush, however. Homeowners do not deduct all expenses
"9 See, e.g., Richard Pomp, Mortgage and Property Tax Deduction: A Tax Expendi-
ture Analysis, 1 CAN. TAX. 23, 25 (1979) (noting Canada's registered homeownership savings
plan allowing individuals to save certain amounts each year tax-free for the purchase of a
home).
I" See, e.g., SIMoNs, supra note 157, at 115-16; White & White, supra note 161, at
228; see also 1990 TAX SIMPLIFICATON PROPOSALS, supra note 105, at 105, 110 (letter of
James P. Holden, Chair, ABA Section of Taxation) ("Members of the task force are of
the view that the deduction on home mortgages has continued to tilt the income tax system
in favor of homeowners.").
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of homeownership. Repairs, maintenance, yard upkeep, water, sew-
age, pest control, fire insurance, and garbage collection all are
nondeductible expenses paid by homeowners. Renters generally do
not pay any of these expenses directly. 19 The landlord pays them
out of rent proceeds. Homeowners also incur other expenses renters
often avoid. For example, most homeowners must purchase drap-
eries, blinds, and appliances, all items many landlords furnish to
tenants. Because house occupants usually incur higher gas and
electric bills than apartment dwellers,2 homeowners may spend
substantially more on these expenses than their renting counter-
parts. Of course, the portion of the mortgage payments attributable
to principal are nondeductible and homeowners cannot depreciate
personal residences for tax purposes. 2°1 Homeowners also pay prop-
erty taxes and interest, both of which are deductible. m Renters
normally avoid paying any property taxes or interest on the rented
unit.
Placing dollar amounts on homeowners' nondeductible ex-
penses is difficult. Repair and maintenance costs differ signifi-
cantly. Under any set of assumptions, however, the homeowner
incurs substantial expenses not incurred directly by the renter. The
landlord must pay for many of the expenses not paid directly by
the tenant, and theoretically sets the rent based to some extent on
anticipated expenses. Other expenses, such as higher utility expenses
in a home, are not duplicated. Professional management of rental
properties, moreover, may provide services and maintenance at a
lower cost per unit through more cost efficient procedures than
can homeowners. Multi-family units occupy less land per unit,
reducing the cost of acquisition and maintenance. Much of a
landlord's profits may come from cost efficient operations. 23
If someone could isolate how much more rent a renter pays
than a similarly situated homeowner pays in nondeductible housing
costs,2 Congress might consider allowing some deduction for ren-
'"Renters can contract to be responsible for some of these expenses. Theoretically,
the rent amount will reflect the bargain.
2w Several factors may explain the lower utility bills for renters. Apartment renters do
not pay for common area utilities. Additionally, most apartments are smaller than most
homes and have more insulation by being next to another unit.
201 Renters cannot depreciate their unit, either. Arguably, however, the rent reflects,
indirectly at least, the landlord's tax savings resulting from the depreciation deductions.
- See I.R.C. §§ 163(a), 164(a).
Landlords of single-family homes are less likely to be able to utilize all the cost
efficient procedures available for multi-unit housing.
- Defining similarly situated renters and homeowners would be difficult since many
renters purchase homes they consider more appealing than the places they rented.
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ters.205 Allowing a deduction for the full amount of the rent pay-
ment would be unjustified, however. A full deduction would give
renters a deduction not given to homeowners. 20 To remedy that
inequality, Congress then would be obliged to authorize home
related expense deductions, including depreciation. 2 7 One proffered
alternative would allow renters to deduct two-thirds of rent pay-
ments.m It should be less. Even then, special rules would need to
address boarding houses, co-renters, and benefits furnished by
landlords for the rent charge such as furnishings and maid service.
Predictably, persons would spend more on rental housing, possibly
reducing the amount spent on other consumer goods, thus reducing
the tax base.2
Professor Henry Simons, in his major treatise, felt that, despite
the complexity, the authorization of a rent deduction would be an
improvement over the current system. 210 The comparison of hom-
eowners to renters, however, must compare the homeowner's non-
deductible expenses to the tenant's rent payment rather than
comparing interest and property taxes deductions to rent.2 1' A
Professor Simons supported full rent deduction if no other suitable solution could
be found. See SIMONS, supra note 157, at 117-18.
-6 See GOODE, supra note 140, at 129.
2" See SIMONS, supra note 157, at 116.
1w See GOODE, supra note 140, at 129.
See id. at 129.
210 See SIMoNs, supra note 157, at 116.
211 "Homeowners are often puzzled by economists' assertions that they derive an
income from their houses; these owners look on their houses as a source of expenses rather
than income." GOODE, supra note 140, at 120. Truly, the homeowner pays no rent other
than the nondeductible and deductible expenditures he would incur for the most part even
if he did not live in the home, and he does benefit from any appreciation in the home's
value. The renter, on the other hand, has nothing to show for his rent, except a place to
live while he pays the rent and an extra $500-$600 a month extra cash expenditures not
expended to purchase a home. The renter must pay taxes on any interest earned from bank
deposits whereas the homeowner pays no tax on the home's appreciation until the hom-
eowner sells the home. The economics of homeownership make sense only if the home itself
is seen as an investment that will appreciate over time. The owner-occupier benefits by
living in the home, of course. The homeowner would incur most of the same expenses,
however, even if the home stood vacant. If the home stood vacant, arguably the owner
could deduct all expenses as investment expenses under I.R.C. § 212 (1988). By living in
the home, the owner-occupier loses some tax deductions. Even losing some deductions, an
owner-occupier may pay less nondeductible expenses than paid by a renter.
For example, the author rents a two bedroom, two-and-a-half bath apartment, with
central air and heat, a disposal, dishwasher, and refrigerator, for just under $500, basic
rent plus utility payments. The units have a common laundry area and a swimming pool,
but no tennis courts, clubhouse, or exercise rooms. The average price of a home in the
Birmingham, Alabama, area is just over $100,000. A three bedroom home in the general
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renter should not deduct any rent expense because the entire rent
payment is for current personal use. The homeowner likewise should
not be able to deduct expenses related to current personal use.
Thus, the current law correctly denies homeowners deductions for
yard care, repairs, maintenance, utilities, and depreciation. The
homeowner should be able to deduct expenses of holding the home
as an investment, however, which include mortgage interest and
property taxes. 2
1 2
The inequity, to the extent one exists between a homeowner
and a renter, arises from the fact that the renter's rent is greater
than the nondeductible amounts paid by the homeowner. To some
extent this inequity results because the rent payment is based in
part on anticipated property taxes and interest payments. Yet the
rent is lower because professional managers23 can incorporate cost
efficiency measures and can deduct depreciation saving the landlord
taxes, 2 4 which in turn reduces the landlord's overall costs. Both of
these should result in lower costs to renters. Moreover, the amount
of difference between rent and owner-occupier's nondeductible costs
result, in part, from the size and cost of the housing unit. Although
vicinity of Samford University costs $70,000 to $200,000. Assuming utilities for a home
would cost $150 a month, property taxes $100 a month, and all maintenance, insurance,
repairs, pest control, and garbage and wastewater expenses totaled $100 a month, the author
would have only $150 out of previous monthly rent payments to pay for refrigerator,
lawnmower, handyman's tools, washer/dryer, and miscellaneous other items needed around
the home, and to make a principal and interest mortgage payment ranging from $700 to
$2000. The nondeductible costs including an allocation of the cost (the depreciation equiv-
alent) of a $100,000 home over forty years would be approximately $450 a month, only
$50 less a month than renting an apartment. This $450 does not include mortgage interest
and property taxes. The comparisons in the previous paragraphs could vary tremendously.
Many persons pay a higher rent than $500. The rent on a $100,000 home easily could be
$900 to $1000, such that the renter would incur $900 to $1000 nondeductible expenses
compared to the owner-occupier of the same home that might have only $450 of nonde-
ductible expenses. On the other hand, many renters pay less than $500 a month rent. The
average rent in Birmingham, for example, is less than $500. For these renters, the nonde-
ductible costs of renting may be less than the nondeductible costs of homeownership.
212 The property tax deduction arguably is an expense associated with the time of
personal use. The Treasury in § 183 regulations, however, allocate them to the holding of
an investment. See Treas. Reg. 1.183-1(b)(1)(ii). Without critical analysis, this Article accepts
the Treasury's interpretation. Whether fire insurance should be considered a deductible
investment expense is an open question. The text's reference to "deductible" and "nonde-
ductible" evades the capitalization alternative. See infra notes 244-248 and accompanying
text.
213 Persons owning only one or two rental units may not be able to operate as cost
efficiently as professional managers. The rents they charge, however, cannot be significantly
higher than that charged by professional managers or they will lose tenants.
254 Depreciation is a nondeductible cost of homeownership. Congress mollifies the
effect by not requiring the homeowner to reduce his basis for the disallowed depreciation.
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clearly only a generalization, most homeowners today still live in
unattached single family units with yards, whereas multi-family
units are the norm for renters. Much of the purchase price, and
hence the property tax and interest charge, are a function of the
value of the underlying land. Single-family homes use more land
per unit than do multi-family units. The amount a landlord must
charge and the resulting upkeep and utility costs, therefore, should
be lower, bringing the average tenant's rent nearer to the nonde-
ductible costs of homeownership.
In any case, inequity between renters and homeowners does
not support denying the homeowner an interest deduction. Interest
should not be the economic equivalent of rent for tax purposes.
Interest is the charge for the money to purchase an investment, the
home. Denying homeowners an interest deduction would not equal-
ize total housing costs of renters and homeowners. Interest denial
would make home purchases more difficult and would encourage
more taxpayers to become or remain renters. 215
4. Homeowners and Real Estate Investors
Investors in real estate deduct all ordinary and necessary ex-
penses for the management, conservation, or maintenance of prop-
erty held for the production of income. 216 The term "income" as
used in this context is not confined to recurring income but applies
as well to gains on the disposition of property. 217 Without question,
an investor that purchases and leases rental property can deduct
all ordinary and necessary expenses, including interest, 21 8 related to
the rental property. Likewise, an investor that purchases and holds
raw land to realize a capital gain on disposition, with no expecta-
tion of receiving any income before disposing of the property, can
deduct the expenses related to the acquisition and holding of the
property. 219 These expenses include management, utilities, mainte-
2,, Theoretically, homes are overpriced because of tax benefits. Disallowing the interest
deduction would eliminate that part of the price. Some of the tax premium would remain
for professional landlords, however, because landlords are able to deduct interest, property
taxes, and depreciation, in addition to deducting all other expenses related to renting.
216 See I.R.C. § 212(2).
217 See Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(b) (as amended in 1975).
212 See id. The taxpayer can deduct these expenses even if the property generates no
income in the taxable year, the property is not currently productive, the property likely will
not be sold at a profit, the property likely will not become productive, and the property is
held merely to minimize a loss. See id.
219 See id.
1991-92]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
nance, repairs, taxes, and insurance. They also include the interest
paid on purchase-money debt. If the property is rental property,
the investor also can depreciate the building for tax purposes.
The homeowner, on the other hand, cannot deduct any expenses
related to the holding of a personal residence other than qualified
residence interest and property taxes.
The following chart compares three investors. Each buys real
estate for $100,000. The first investor buys raw land, the second
rental property, and the third a personal residence. The owner of
the rental property receives $800 a month rent. Each investor incurs
$900-a-month mortgage interest and $100 in property taxes. The
owners of the rental property and the personal residence each incur
$300-a-month extra expenses, deductible by the owner of the rental
property but not deductible by the homeowner. The rental property
investor takes a $200-a-month depreciation deduction. One column
for the homeowner assumes that the homeowner receives a home
mortgage interest deduction and a property tax deduction. The
other homeowner column assumes the homeowner receives no such
deduction.
Residence Residence Raw Land Rental
Nondeductible Deductible
Tax Income
Income 0 0 0 $800
Deductions22' 0 (1000) (1000) (1500)
Income 0 (1000) (1000) ($700)
Cash Flow
Receipts 0 0 0 $800
Payments (1300) (1300) (1000) (1300)
Tax Savings2 0 300 300 210
Net ($1300) ($1000) ($700) ($290)
First, comparing the homeowner to the owner of raw land, if
the homeowner is deemed to be owning the home for dual pur-
poses, deducting the expenses of purchasing and holding the in-
vestment while not deducting the expenses related to current personal
-o See I.R.C. § 167(a).
2' The $1000 deductions result from the $900 interest and the $100 property tax. The
owner of the rental property deducts, in addition to the $1000, $300 of other expenses and
$200 depreciation.
22 Tax savings calculations use a 30% tax rate. Currently, the maximum tax rate for
individuals is 31%. See I.R.C. § 1.
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use equates the homeowner with the investor in raw land. Both
investors would qualify for a $1000 interest deduction. If the
homeowner is denied the interest deduction, the homeowner pays
more after tax dollars for the investment than does the investor in
raw land. The discrepancy exists in the example because the inves-
tor in raw land reduces tax liability for the $1000 monthly interest
and property tax payments so that he pays $300 per month, or
$3600 a year, less income taxes than would the homeowner.
Under the example given, the investor incurred no expenses for
holding the land. Had the investor incurred maintenance or other
expenses, he would have been allowed to deduct those expenses as
well.m Allowing the investor those deductions, while denying the
maintenance and other expenses incurred by the homeowner, rec-
ognizes that the homeowner incurs the current expenditures, other
than those to purchase and hold the investment, as personal living
expenses. 224 The investor at any time has the right to use the raw
land for any legal purpose, including personal purposes, but until
he acts positively to use the property for personal purposes, Con-
gress properly should allow a deduction for all expenses, even those
only benefiting the current period.
Comparing the homeowner to the owner of rental property,
although both spend the same amount during the month, the cash
flow disparity between the two is significant. Much of the differ-
ence results because the owner of the rental property receives rent,
$800 in the example, to defray cash outflow. Against that $800
income, the owner properly is allowed to deduct the current de-
ductions and the depreciation deduction.? The homeowner, on
the other hand, properly deducts neither the current expenses nor
the depreciation.
The investment purpose, holding the real estate for gain on
disposition, is the same for both. The owner of the rental property,
just as the homeowner, holds the property to profit by its appre-
ciation in value. The property's annual value increase is not taxed
until the taxpayer sells the property. Perhaps ideally, all costs of
purchasing and holding the property, including the interest expense,
should be deferred until the owner disposes of the property. 226
- See id. § 212(2).
2U See id.
21 See supra notes 149-156 and accompanying text.
211 For a discussion of adjusting for the inflation component of interest payments, see
infra notes 243-248 and accompanying text.
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Interest payments would be offset against the proceeds of sale.
Under this approach, the horizontal inequity of disallowing the
homeowner an interest deduction becomes even more apparent.
The homeowner and the rental property owner, for example, might
pay $50,000 interest before the property is sold. On the sale,
theoretically both then should deduct the interest from the proceeds
to calculate gain. To deny the homeowner the offsetting interest
deduction would favor one real estate investment activity over
another. Under current law, the taxpayer does not defer taking an
interest deduction until disposing of the property. Rather, the
taxpayer deducts the interest in the year paid. This ability to
accelerate the deduction should not obscure the fact that the inter-
est is to finance an investment the profits of which come signifi-
cantly from the property's appreciation in value.227 Not allowing
the homeowner an interest deduction, therefore, would favor inves-
tors in rental real estate over owner-occupiers.
E. Other Issues
1. Tracing Loan Proceeds
Some proponents of an unrestricted home equity loan interest
deduction cite the difficulties encountered in tracing loan proceeds
as a reason for allowing unrestricted deduction of all home equity
loan interest payments.? The administrative problems associated
with tracing loans occur because money is fungible. Taxpayers
often commingle loan proceeds with other cash accounts and then
expend the funds from those accounts for multiple purposes. In-
stead of tracing the loan proceeds to expenditures, the taxpayer
might trace the use of the loan proceeds back to the underlying
debt. To a large extent, however, determining whether interest on
a loan is deductible based on how the taxpayer expended the loan
proceeds encounters the same problem as tracing the source of
funds because of money's fungibility. Loan proceeds placed in a
common account lose the identity of loan proceeds. Tracing loan
proceeds to or from any single expenditure would be arbitrary and
subject to the taxpayer's control.
22 This point is apparent as well in comparing homeownership to investment in raw
land.
22 See DEP'T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BAsIc TAX REFORM 88 (1977).
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Most problems created by commingled funds can be overcome.
In fact, tracing problems do not usually arise. Home mortgages,
for example, normally are traceable because the lender often writes
the check to the seller or requires an immediate pledging of the
residence to secure the debt.229 Additionally, the borrowed amount
and the proximity of the loan disbursement to the closing date
make tracing practicable. Most purchase-money loans are likewise
traceable. Only loans in which the funds are commingled create
allocation problems. For these situations the burden could be placed
on the taxpayer to trace the proceeds to a business, investment,
personal, or residence use before the taxpayer could receive a
deduction. This burden shifting would encourage taxpayers to seg-
regate personal use funds from other funds to facilitate tracing.
Although the tracing option seems manageable for direct ex-
penditures, tracing loan proceeds to direct purchases omits inquiry
into the taxpayer's ability to structure the transaction artificially
to create a business or investment loan rather than a personal use
loan. Many taxpayers have flexibility to borrow only in situations
that guaranty that interest will be deductible and to use cash or
proceeds from the sales of assets to fund purchases and activities
that do not qualify for the interest deduction. Money used to
purchase a home or automobile may be acquired, for example, by
withdrawing money from savings, by selling assets, by borrowing
against business property, by borrowing against the purchased
property, or by a number of other methods. More specifically, a
taxpayer may borrow against business or investment assets or ven-
tures and use the funds for personal acquisitions. More indirectly,
the taxpayer may borrow funds needed in the operation of a
business or for investment while purchasing personal assets with
cash 30 Such a taxpayer then deducts the interest as a business
expense while persons that are unable, or that did not think to
structure their transactions similarly, are denied an interest deduc-
tion. 23 Thus some taxpayers can control their tax results.
29 Michael J. McIntyre, An Inquiry Into the Special Status of Interest Payments, 1981
DUKE L.J. 765, 784 (1981).
2" See Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal
Expenditures, 16 J.L. & EcoN. 193, 202 (1973).
21 See also Lawrence Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical Analysis
of the Anti-Tax Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 TEx. L. REv. 499,
571-72 (1989) (providing, as an illustration, taxpayer that sells bond, uses proceeds to buy
asset, and then borrows money to purchase bond identical to one sold).
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Assuming that the ideal characterization scheme is based on
the use of loan proceeds, 2 the problems associated with commin-
gling, and the inherent arbitrariness of tracing schemes, should not
preclude requiring attempts to trace. In fact, the Treasury has
issued regulations for the allocation of interest expense. 233 These
regulations allocate interest and the underlying loan according to
the use of the loan proceeds. 234 The regulations stress that the
allocation is not affected by the use of the property securing the
loan.235 To illustrate, the regulations posit a taxpayer that pledges
corporate stock held as an investment to secure a loan the proceeds
of which are used to purchase an automobile for personal use.2 6
Predictably, the example holds that the interest expense will be
personal even though investment property secures the debt.237 The
regulations provide that traceable purchases will be allocated in
accordance with the use of the proceeds. 238 They further provide a
series of ordering rules for expenditures from accounts if the nexus
between the loan and the purchases is attenuated and the borrowed
funds have been commingled with unborrowed funds.239
232 Classifying a loan as business, investment, qualified residence, or personal could be
accomplished by looking at the security given for the loan, at how the loan proceeds are
expended, at the expected source of interest or loan principal repayment, or at the capacity
in which the taxpayer ostensibly borrowed the money. Each approach could result in
significantly different classifications. Which of the characterization approaches is best suited
to the tax laws is beyond the scope of this Article. Currently, characterization of a loan,
and consequently the interest payments on the loan, flows from the use of the loan proceeds.
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(c).
23 See id. § 1.163-8T. For an in-depth discussion of the tracing regulations, see John
V. Taggart, Denial of the Personal Interest Deduction, 41 TAX LAW. 195, 248-60 (1988).
For a slightly different allocation proposal, generally favorable to taxpayers, see McIntyre,
supra note 229, at 779-88. First, Professor McIntyre would allocate purchase-money debt
the same as the asset purchased. See id. at 784. This step would handle the vast majority
of consumer loans according to Professor McIntyre. Home mortgages, car loans, and
installment sales account for over ninety percent of consumer loans. See id. at 785 n.56
(citing 66 Fed. Res. Bull. A42, A44 (Sept. 1980)). For loans not easily traced to an
expenditure, Professor McIntyre would allocate the loans incurred during the current year
as spent in the year, in the order of the borrowings in the case of multiple borrowings, in
a manner favoring deductibility of the interest payments to expenditures in the following
order: (1) current business expenses, (2) depreciable or amortizable income-producing prop-
erty, (3) other income-producing property, (4) consumer durables, and (5) current con-
sumption expenses. See id. at 783.
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(c)(1).
23 See id.
See id.
23 See id. The home equity indebtedness provisions stray from this model by looking
not at the use of the proceeds but at the security for the loan. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C).
For a discussion, see infra notes 289-298 and accompanying text.
38 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(c)(1).
- See id. § 1.163-8T(c)(4), (5).
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Because of the diverse tax .treatment afforded interest based on
classification, ° the manipulative characterization step often is the
most critical. Although the regulations develop a procedure to
allocate current borrowings based on how the loan proceeds are
expended, the regulations do not attempt to address the taxpayer's
ability to structure fund sources to maximize favorable tax treat-
ments. For example, a taxpayer could sell corporate stock for cash
and buy a personal automobile. Then the taxpayer could borrow
funds to purchase shares of the corporate stock, or of some other
investment asset qualifying the interest as investment interest. In
fact, the regulations seemingly encourage taxpayer choice in tax
treatment. 241 For example, under the regulations a taxpayer can
transfer loan proceeds to accounts used exclusively for business or
investments, thereby guaranteeing that the interest payments qual-
ify for business or investment characterization. 242 The regulations
do not consider the taxpayer's option of borrowing only in a trade
or business while using savings or proceeds from the sale of assets
for personal expenditures.
Perhaps the regulatory approach, though far from ideal, is
acceptable. Certainly the taxpayer not in a position to structure
-o Trade or business interest generally is deductible in the year accrued or paid. See
I.R.C. § 163(a). But, if the trade or business is a passive activity as to the taxpayer the
interest expense is subject to passive activity loss limitation rules, which delay deduction
until the taxpayer recognizes passive activity gains or disposes of the investment. See id. §
469(a), (b), (g) (1988). Interest on investments other than passive activities are deductible
only to the extent the taxpayer recognizes investment income during the year. See id. §
163(d). Qualified residence interest, including interest on acquisition indebtedness and on
home equity indebtedness, is deductible in the current year if the taxpayer itemizes. See id.
§ 163(h)(2)(D). All other personal interest is nondeductible. See id. § 163(h)(1). Other
specific provisions require that interest be capitalized as part of an acquired asset. See, e.J.,
id. § 263(g) (1988) (straddles); id. § 263A(f) (1988) (property produced by taxpayer); id. §
266 (1988) (certain carrying charges, subject to taxpayer election). Yet other provisions
disallow otherwise deductible interest payments. See, e.g., id. § 163(f) (requiring certain
obligations to be in registered form); id. § 264(a) (1988) (interest on indebtedness to purchase
or carry certain life insurance policies); id. § 265(a)(2) (1988) (interest on indebtedness to
purchase or carry tax-exempt bonds); id. § 279(a) (1988) (interest paid or incurred by a
corporation with respect to certain acquisitions of stock or assets of another corporation).
Some additional provisions defer when a taxpayer is allowed a deduction for interest. See,
e.g., id. § 267(a)(2) (1988) (interest paid to related parties); id. § 465 (1988) (at risk
limitations); id. § 1277 (1988) (interest deduction allocable to accrued market discount).
1" See, e.g., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(c)(4)(iii)(A) (allowing taxpayer to treat
checks written on the same day as written in any order); id. § 1.163-8T(c)(iii)(B) (allowing
taxpayer to treat any expenditure made from an account within 15 days after debt proceeds
are deposited as made from such proceeds); id. § 1.163-8T(c)(4)(vi) (requiring allocation
rules to apply separately to each account of taxpayer).
m See id. § 1.163-8T(c)(4)(vi).
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loans through a business will be denied an interest deduction. The
beneficiary of the structuring loophole is the taxpayer having the
wherewithal to camouflage personal borrowings. The administra-
tive cost of preventing such maneuverings, however, may be too
onerous to justify implementing more complex allocation rulesY3
2. Accounting for the Inflation Component of Interest
Congress has not addressed the inflation component of interest
charges. It needs to evaluate whether interest in general should be
deductible in the year paid or incurred, or whether some or all of
the interest payment should be capitalized. Although interest paid
may have been a charge for the use of money at a time when
inflation was slight, in the current economic situation, a significant
part of any interest charge is not merely for the use of money but
to compensate for the effects of inflation.2" Perhaps a portion of
the interest payment representing an inflation adjustment as part
of the purchased asset should be capitalized.24 Requiring capitali-
zation would roughly record as part of the asset's basis the value
of the dollar at the time the payment is made rather than an
undervalued purchase price when actual payments are made at
future periods.2" Capitalization also delays the deduction until the
asset is sold or a depreciation charge is appropriate. A significant
change in the treatment of qualified interest taxation under this
approach would be to require the homeowner to capitalize all or
part of the interest into basis.2 7
Capitalization should become more significant if Congress
adopts indexing. The increase in basis for the effects of inflation
under indexing plans would need to be offset by the inflationary
effect already expensed by a taxpayer in the guise of an interest
deduction. One method to accomplish this would be to disallow
all interest deductions, or at least that component of the interest
'A' See Zelenak, supra note 231, at 570-76.
',, See McIntyre, supra note 229, at 796-97.
2, For administrative simplicity, Congress may choose to require capitalization of the
full amount.
2" Congress would need to work out problems, including those resulting when the
taxpayer has sold or otherwise disposed of the underlying asset or when the loan proceeds
were expenses rather than assets. A solution would be to allow full deductions once the
taxpayer no longer owns the underlying asset or in appropriate cases to capitalize the interest
in other related assets.
U4 This may be counterproductive to helping taxpayers purchase residences. See supra
notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
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payment representing inflation adjustment.2 A significant change
in qualified residence interest, under this approach, would be a
denial of all interest payments if indexing applies to residences and
other personal use assets. Similarly, this consideration would be-
come significant if Congress re-instates a capital gain preference.
Ill. AN EVALUATION OF THE QUALIFIED RESIDENCE INTEREST
PROVISIONS
Currently, taxpayers can deduct qualified residence interest. 9
Congress could eliminate the qualified residence interest deduction
completely, revive the old law of allowing all interest deductions,
maintain the provision as currently enacted, or modify the current
approach in some manner. The earlier parts of this Article devel-
oped the debate over whether the mortgage interest should be
allowed. The amount of grumblings over the current law suggests
that Congress will be asked to modify, but not repeal, the provi-
sion. This section evaluates the qualified residence interest section
for possible modifications.
A. Acquisition Indebtedness
Qualified residence interest includes acquisition indebtedness
and home equity indebtednessY5 Acquisition indebtedness is any
indebtedness incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially
improving any qualified residence of the taxpayer if the total
acquisition indebtedness does not exceed one million dollars2' and
if the indebtedness is secured by the residence.5 2 It also includes
refinancings of acquisition indebtedness to the extent the refinanced
amount is not greater than the remaining balance of the acquisition
debt being refinanced.2 3 Acquisition indebtedness is the least con-
troversial of the two categories. As long as Congress allows qual-
24 Intriguingly, a recognition of interest's role as partly to adjust for inflation may
require a rethinking of the original issue discount (OilD) rules; to allocate a greater share
of the total proceeds to principal than current law provides.
-9 See I.R.C. § 163 (1988).
- See id. § 163(h)(3).
21 See id. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii).
"I See id. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i)(II).
253 See id. § 163(h)(3)(B). The limitation provision prevents taxpayers from combining
a refinancing with an increased borrowing on equity to increase acquisition indebtedness.
For example, a homeowner with a $90,000 first mortgage in the process of refinancing the
mortgage may borrow $150,000: $90,000 to retire the first mortgage and $60,000 to be used
for other purposes.
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ified residence interest deductions, acquisition indebtedness in some.
form will qualify for the deduction. Congress could revisit some
provisions concerning acquisition indebtedness, however.
1. Two Qualified Residences
Congress should reconsider allowing a taxpayer to claim two
qualified residences. Presently, both a taxpayer's principal resi-
dence and one other residence, used and selected by the taxpayer,
are qualified residences.2 4 Acquisition indebtedness properly should
See id. § 163(h)(4). A taxpayer uses a dwelling unit as a residence if he uses the
unit for personal purposes for the greater of (a) 14 days or (b) the number of days equal
to 10% of the days the taxpayer rents the unit out at a fair rental. See id. § 280A(d)(1)
(1988). If the taxpayer does not rent the dwelling unit at any time during the taxable year,
he may treat the dwelling unit as a residence notwithstanding § 280A(d). See id. §
163(h)(4)(A)(iii). For the legislative history, see S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 806-
07 (1986).
Although the legislative reports do not address why Congress included second resid-
ences, or vacation homes, as qualified residences, some reasons can be gleaned from the
hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee. The American Land Development
Association (ALDA), in hearings on the bill, set out most of the arguments in favor of
including vacation homes as qualified residences. Some arguments duplicated those for
allowing a full interest deduction for consumer interest and will not be discussed here.
Specifically, ALDA argued that limiting the deductibility of consumer interest unfairly
discriminates against persons that must borrow in favor of persons that can pay cash. See
Comprehensive Tax Reform: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess. 4316, 4317 & 4325-29 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Lee H.
Henkel, Jr., representing ALDA); supra notes 188-193 and accompanying text. ALDA also
argued that denying interest on second homes would lead to tax manipulation. See id. at
4334-36.
Birnbaum and Murray, in their book Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lob-
byists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform, identify the American Land Development
Association and its lobbyist, Thomas Franks, as the key movers in favor of continuing
interest deductions for loans to acquire vacation homes. See BnumNAUM & MURRAY, supra
note 134, at 11.
Any change in the tax law may penalize persons that relied on the law in purchasing
an asset. Vacation home purchasers may have relied on beneficial tax laws in making their
purchases. Disallowing second home equity loan interest deductions is nevertheless justifiable
by tempering the loss by grandfathering the deduction or using a transition period. Yet,
predictably, the value of vacation homes would fall because of the tax law changes. In one
sense vacation homes may be overpriced because they do come with tax sheltering oppor-
tunities. Buyers pay for the tax benefits whether they recognize it or not. The denial of
interest deduction should cause the value to fall by removing future tax benefits. Moreover,
the monthly cash outlay to buy a unit is greater without tax savings, so potential buyers
could not afford to spend as much on the homes. In addition, the absence of an interest
deduction for the homes would place the vacation home in a competitively disadvantageous
position compared with other investments for which interest remains deductible.
The same analysis applies to principal residences. The price of principal residences is
higher because of the tax preferences including the interest deduction. A denial of the
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be limited to the loans, and refinancings of loans, to acquire and
improve the taxpayer's principal residence. As long as Congress
allows interest for $100,000 worth of debt in addition to interest
on acquisition indebtedness, the $100,000 amount should be suf-
ficient to cover second residences or vacation homes. In 1985,
proponents of the vacation home deduction stressed that the av-
erage purchase price for non-principal residences was $42,000 and
most purchases were for less than $25,000.255 This information
indicates that the $100,000 limit is sufficient for persons to deduct
all interest on loans to buy a vacation home. 256 Moreover, to retain
the additional qualification for a second residence goes beyond the
need to encourage family residence purchases.
Congress may choose to continue the second home mortgage
interest deduction as a benefit to the vacation home construction
and tourist services industries. These industries are localized in
selected geographic areas. For example, in 1980 nearly half of all
homes on Hilton Head Island in South Carolina were vacation
homes .2 7 Studies offered to Congress indicated that the vacation
homes industry is sensitive to price changes and changes in the
economy. 28 Under a worst case scenario vacation home construc-
tion could fall thirty-five percent, resulting in the loss of 15,000
construction jobs and 9000 net jobs if the second residence allow-
ance is revoked. 259 In many areas, the local economy does not offer
a range of industry, forcing displaced workers to relocate to find
work.26 Many of the displaced construction workers must find
work outside of the construction field. 261 The worst case scenarios
were premised on statutory enactments that Congress did not enact.
interest deduction should result in a devaluation of homes, partly because of lost tax benefits
premiums, and partly because interest nondeductibility may prevent some persons from
purchasing homes.
21 See Hearings, supra note 254, at 4325 (statement of Lee H. Henkel, Jr., representing
ALDA).
2m The person buying the vacation home must have equity in the principal residence
for the $100,000 home equity limitation to be of any benefit. Otherwise, the purchaser of
the second home receives no interest deduction. See infra notes 296-298 and accompanying
text.
See Hearings, supra note 254, at 4358.
See id. at 4360.
29 See id. at 4350-51. The projections took into effect the nondeductibility of property
taxes, which was part of the President's proposals. Property taxes continue to be deductible.
The projections did not address the effect of the nondeductibility of mortgage interest. It
may be presumed it would hurt the vacation home construction industry.
See id. at 4331.
7, See id.
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Unless Congress is convinced the vacation home industry cannot
prosper without the two qualified residence provisions, Congress
should limit the home mortgage interest deduction to principal
residences.
Despite the prior paragraphs' proposal that home mortgage
interest deduction should be available only for principal residences,
this article's basic premise that people buy homes as investments
applies as well to second homes, including vacation homes. There-
fore, Congress should recognize that taxpayers buy second homes
both for recreational use and as an investment. Bifurcating the
second home into its personal and investment components would
allow deduction of all investment expenses and deny all personal
expenses. Interest is an investment expense, and therefore would
be deductible. 2 2 Also, allowing interest, property tax and possibly
property insurance deductions, but denying maintenance, repair
and depreciation deductions, approximates the results of bifurca-
tion without bifurcation's clerical burdens.
This bifurcation theory applies equally to most real estate hold-
ings. In general people purchase real estate, in significant part, for
investment purposes. Therefore, acceptance of the bifurcation the-
ory should lead to the allowance of interest deduction on an
unlimited number of qualified residences, not just one additional
residence, since the theory applies to nearly all real property pur-
chases. It would not reach all assets, however. Assets with no
reasonable expectation of appreciation and those to be depleted
through personal use would not be subject to the bifurcation
theory. Automobiles, computers, boats and short-term leases, for
example, would not qualify because the owner using these for
personal purposes normally does not buy them anticipating a profit
on their sale. Likewise, no interest deduction would be allowed for
interest financing personal expenses.
2. The Residence As Security For Acquisition Indebtedness
The requirement that the residence secure the acquisition
indebtedness 263 should be retained. The Code's tracing rules em-
m See supra notes 149-153 and accompanying text; cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(d)(1)
(1972) (bifurcating interest on a mortgage for a farm into personal use of hobby farming
and investment use of holding of the land as an investment). Instead of allowing a deduction,
Congress might require capitalization of some or all interest into the home's basis. See
supra notes 244-248 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(II).
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phasize the use of the proceeds, not the source of the funds, the
collateral securing the debt, or the expected source of repayment.2
Thus, to be justified, the acquisition indebtedness requirement must
trace the use of the loan proceeds. Requiring the residence to secure
the acquisition indebtedness serves this purpose well in most in-
stances. Generally, the lending institution requires the home pur-
chaser to use the proceeds for the home purchase and the pledging
of the purchased home is an integral part of the mortgage acqui-
sition process. 265 The pledged home is a reliable indicator that the
indebtedness and purchase are related.
The pledging requirement is under inclusive in some instances.
A purchaser that borrows to purchase a qualified residence, pledg-
ing another asset as security, should be able to establish by the
loan amount, the purchase price, and the temporal proximity of
the loan and the purchase that the loan proceeds were expended
to purchase the residence. The John Sununu situation serves as a
good example. 26 Mr. Sununu borrowed moiiey from his home
bank, pledging his longtime residence as security. He then paid an
amount equal to most of the loan proceeds to purchase a residence
near Washington, D.C. Because he did not pledge the new residence
to secure the loan, however, the loan did not qualify as acquisition
indebtedness. Nonetheless, the requirement that the acquired resi-
dence secure the debt is an easily understood test. The government
and the taxpayer then can identify the loan as one incurred to
acquire a residence years after the initial purchase. In appropriate
situations, the Treasury may consider developing procedures for
lenders or homeowners to identify loans incurred to purchase a
residence without requiring an actual pledge.2 7
Homeowners pledge the residence less frequently to secure home
improvement loans. Some homeowners do grant lenders second
mortgages on the home to be improved. Others, however, finance
the improvements in other ways to avoid the transaction costs
associated with traditional home improvement loans.26 Thus, a
2" See supra notes 228-243 and accompanying text.
= See McIntyre, supra note 229, at 784-85.
See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
267 The Treasury already allows persons that do not pledge the purchased home to
secure the loan or that only later use the home as a principal residence. See I.R.S. Notice
88-74, 1988-2 C.B. 385. The debt then qualifies as acquisition indebtedness. See id.
2" The transaction costs associated with mortgage loans may include points, appraisal
fees, attorney's fees, and recording fees. As these amounts become a larger percentage of
the amount to be borrowed, the homeowner often looks for financing options with lower
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homeowner may take out an unsecured personal loan or one se-
cured by stocks or other personalty, may use established lines of
credit, may borrow against insurance policies, may charge against
credit cards, or may enter into short-term payment plans with a
construction company. Yet, the Code requires that the residence
secure the debt before the debt can qualify as acquisition indebt-
edness. As a result, some home improvement loans do not qualify
as acquisition indebtedness. Requiring the taxpayer to secure the
home improvement loan with the qualified residence generally elim-
inates only de minimis deductions because the homeowner can take
out a second mortgage, use a home equity line of credit mortgage,
or elect to have the home secure the loan if he wants to qualify
for the interest deduction. Thus, Congress may choose to leave the
security requirement as is, even if it is not perfect. Otherwise,
Congress or the Treasury may develop alternative methods for
homeowners to identify home improvement loans.
3. Refinanced Acquisition Indebtedness
A homeowner can refinance acquisition indebtedness and qual-
ify the new debt as acquisition indebtedness to the extent the
resulting debt does not exceed the amount of the acquisition in-
debtedness immediately before the refinancing.2 9 Congress should
continue to allow refinancings of acquisition indebtedness to qual-
ify as acquisition indebtedness. The Treasury has taken the posi-
tion, under § 461(g), 270 that points paid to refinance acquisition
indebtedness of a principal residence are not immediately deductible
because the loan proceeds are used to retire the acquisition indebt-
edness and not to acquire or construct the principal residence. 27'
This dubious reasoning should not be extended to the qualified
costs. Because the home normally costs more than home improvements, these loan acqui-
sition costs are a smaller percentage of the loan amounts than of home improvement loans.
The size of the loan to purchase a home often is high enough that fewer purchasers enjoy
financing alternatives to the traditional mortgage.
See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i).
-0 Id. § 461(g) (1988).
-1 See Rev. Rul. 87-22, 1987-1 C.B. 146. The Treasury narrowly construed the legis-
lative history. The deductibility of points is beyond this Article's scope, but the Treasury's
position on its face seems untenable, and Congress, when it addresses interest deductions
related to the principal residence, should make clear that homeowners can deduct immedi-
ately points paid to refinance acquisition indebtedness on a principal residence. The Tax
Court has agreed with the Service, however. See Huntsman v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 917
(1988), rev'd on other grounds, 905 F. 2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1990).
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residence interest rules. The indebtedness on refinancing should
retain its original status as acquisition indebtedness. When a tax-
payer refinances to change payment terms or to reduce the interest
rate, his original obligation incurred to purchase the residence
continues unabated. So should the status of the indebtedness as
acquisition indebtedness. Appropriately, there is no indication that
Congress will revoke the provision characterizing qualified refi-
nancings as acquisition indebtedness.
B. Home Equity Indebtedness
1. Background
More controversial than the deduction of interest on acquisition
indebtedness is the deduction of interest on home equity indebt-
edness. Home equity indebtedness is any indebtedness secured by
a qualified residence, other than acquisition indebtedness, to the
extent this indebtedness does not exceed the taxpayer's equity in
the residence.272 As a further limitation, a taxpayer's aggregate
amount of debt that can qualify as home equity indebtedness
cannot exceed $100,000.273
Home equity loans, once called second mortgages, 274 take one
of two forms. The more traditional form is the closed-end loan,
which provides for payment within a set period of time at a pre-
determined interest rate with a fixed repayment schedule. 275 A
newer form, quickly growing in popularity, is a line of credit
account. 27 6 The homeowner may borrow such amounts, and at such
times, at his discretion up to the amount of the credit line. The
homeowner pledges the residence to secure future draws. Typically,
m See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i). The statute does not use "home equity" in its definition
of home equity indebtedness. Instead, the Code incorporates the concept of home equity
as part of the definition of home equity indebtedness. The statute defines home equity
indebtedness "as any indebtedness (other than acquisition indebtedness) secured by a quhl-
ified residence to the extent the aggregate amount of such indebtedness does not exceed (I)
the fair market value of such qualified residence reduced by (II) the amount of acquisition
indebtedness with respect to such residence." Id.
23 See id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii). The amount cannot exceed $50,000 for a married individ-
ual filing a separate return. See id.
21 See, e.g., Glen B. Canner et. al., Home Equity Lending, 75 Fed. Reserve Bull. 333,
333 n.2 (1989).
"I See id. at 333.
26 See id. Of home equity loans originating in 1988, 63% were line of credit loans
and 37% were closed-end loans. See id. at 334.
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line of credit loans have more flexible repayment requirements than
do closed-end loans. 2" Although both type loans are used to im-
prove the home and to repay other debts, line of credit loans are
more popular to finance automobiles, medical needs, education,
vacations, furniture, appliances, personal financial investments,
recreational vehicles including boats, and income tax payments. 28
Despite strong marketing by financial institutions that has re-
sulted in significant increases in home equity loans, 279 one study
concludes that home equity loans primarily substitute for other
types of debt and therefore have not expanded the total consumer
debt.8 Taxpayers cite interest deductibility as a major factor in
using home equity loans.u1 Homeowners have not limited the home
equity loan to single loans with one asset, with the home as
collateral, but have pledged the home to secure many debts and
have pledged the home as but one of several assets securing some
obligations. For example, a homeowner might pledge both the
home and a newly purchased automobile to secure the note to
purchase the automobile.n 2 In addition, although not yet publicized
as a problem, no satisfactory method has been devised to insure
that taxpayers are valuing their homes accurately or that they are
limiting the interest deduction on qualified home equity to indebt-
edness no greater than equity in the home. For example, although
banks may loan only up to eighty percent of the home's fair market
value, the homeowner may also pledge the home for other pur-
chases, such as in the automobile example. The total of these loans
could exceed the homeowner's equity. House Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski has indicated that Con-
gress needs to examine home equity loans because taxpayers are
using the home equity loan provision to circumvent the provisions
disallowing deductions for personal interest. 283 Congress should
See id. at 334.
" See id. at 337. Researchers have surmised that the convenience of line of credit
loans make them attractive for relatively small purchases, unanticipated emergencies, and
outlays recurring over time. Household furnishings, medical expenses, and college education
expenses are examples. In contrast, the closed-end loans are more suitable for large, isolated
events such as the purchase of real estate. See id. at 338.
See id. at 334.
2w See id. at 339.
2' See id. at 338. Line of credit loans are more popular than closed-end loans because
they are more convenient. See id.
n See CongressionalRoundup: Guarini Bill Would Limit Interest Deduction For Home
Equity Loans, 51 TAX Nom-s 1200 (June 3, 1991).
21 See News Briefs: Congress Will Reexamine Home Equity Deductions, Rosty Pre-
dicts, TAX NoTEs June 10, 1991, at 1239, 1239.
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have foreseen, and in fact did foresee,n4 taxpayers using home
equity loans to maximize tax sheltering opportunities.
2. The Case For Repealing the Home Equity Indebtedness
Provision
Congress has many options in resolving the home equity ques-
tions. First, and conceptually the preferred choice, Congress could
limit qualified residence interest to acquisition and home improve-
ment indebtedness and eliminate the interest deduction on home
equity indebtedness altogether. Congress would then be forced to
decide whether taxpayers should be allowed any deductions for
consumer interest instead of avoiding the issue. If Congress allowed
interest deductions only on acquisition debt, refinancings of ac-
quisition indebtedness would be categorized as acquisition debt
only to the extent the refinancing does not exceed the amount of
any acquisition indebtedness immediately before the refinancing.
To illustrate, a taxpayer that buys a home for $200,000, granting
a mortgage for $180,000 as part payment, can refinance the $180,000
and treat it as acquisition indebtedness. If the taxpayer had refi-
nanced the mortgage to $200,000, only the $180,000 balance im-
mediately before the refinancing would qualify as acquisition
indebtedness. If the taxpayer had reduced the mortgage principal
balance to $150,000 prior to refinancing the mortgage to $180,000
or $200,000, only $150,000 of the new mortgage would qualify as
acquisition indebtedness.
All other options legitimize receiving an interest deduction for
borrowings against home equity. For example, Congress could treat
as qualified residence indebtedness any refinancings or additional
borrowings up to the amount of the original acquisition indebted-
ness. Under the above example, the taxpayer that reduced the
outstanding mortgage balance to $150,000 could treat a refinancing
of the note up to $180,000 or an additional borrowed amount
$30,000 as qualified indebtedness as long as total borrowings char-
But let me remind my colleagues that no sooner had this bill been crafted
to eliminate the ability to deduct consumer interest - an important principle
of this bill - than we started seeing ads in newspapers and hearing them on
the radio about how you can borrow money against your home for all kinds
of purposes that are not tax deductible and those loans will be tax deductible.
132 CoNG. REc. S7391 (daily ed. June 12, 1986) (statement of Sen. Gramm); see also
Kenneth R. Harney, Prescription for a 2d Home: Go with the (Tax) Flow, WASH. PosT,
May 18, 1985, at E30, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 254, at 4365.
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acterized as qualified residence indebtedness did not exceed the
original $180,000 mortgage. Alternatively, Congress can return to
the 1986 Act's use of the taxpayer's cost basis in the residence.Us5
In contrast to the taxpayer under the first two options, the taxpayer
under this option could treat as qualified indebtedness refinancing
or other total borrowings up to the $200,000 cost basis notwith-
standing the mortgage's principal balance immediately before re-
financing. Thus, the taxpayer in the above example with a mortgage
principal balance of $150,000 could refinance the mortgage up to
$200,000 or borrow $50,000 and treat the full $200,000 as qualified
residence indebtedness.
As another alternative, Congress could classify as qualified
indebtedness refinancing or total borrowings up to the residence's
fair market value. This was an early proposal in the 1986 qualified
residence interest debate.286 The current law's authorization of an
interest deduction on acquisition indebtedness and home equity
indebtedness is a variation of this option. The 1987 Act modified
the approach by limiting the amount that could be borrowed
against the home equity portion of the residence's fair market
value to $100,000.28 7
Which option should be adopted depends on the true congres-
sional purpose for allowing the home mortgage interest deduction.
If Congress wants to help Americans own homes, limiting quali-
fying debt to the remaining balance of actual acquisition indebt-
edness, including debts for improvements, seems appropriate and
adequate. As a practical matter, homebuyers need the most assis-
tance in the early stages of purchasing a home. As the years pass,
however, the mortgage payment remains fixed.1 Historically, sal-
IS See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.). H.R. Corn. RaP. No. 841, 99rH CONG., 2D Sass.
11-154-55 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4242-43.
See H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
2" As a final option, Congress could allow all deductions as long as the taxpayer
pledges a residence to secure the debt. In the above example, under this option, the
homeowner could borrow $500,000 and treat the entire amount as residence indebtedness
by pledging the residence as security, even if the residence's fair market value was only
$200,000. This option has little or no chance of becoming law. If enacted, it would allow
interest deductions for all loans because the taxpayer could pledge her residence for all
loans even if the lender in practice required additional collateral sufficient in itself to secure
the loan. This option would eliminate the interest deduction for those not owning homes.
If Congress seriously considers this option, it should return to allowing all interest as
deductions instead.
The monthly payment may rise if the homeowner has a variable rate mortgage or
if property taxes increase. Even then the amount of the loan does not increase so that the
homeowner still pays less than a new purchaser if the home has increased in value.
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aries rise so that the homeowner pays a smaller percentage of
income on mortgage payments than at the time of purchase. In
addition, historically homes have risen in value so that the hom-
eowner pays less monthly for the home than would a new purchaser
of a similarly valued home. After a time, a homeowner pays less
than a person renting similar or lesser accommodations.
Using more traditional legal reasoning, Congress, the Treasury,
and the commentators currently favor characterizing a loan, and
consequently the interest on the loan, based on the use of the loan
proceeds.289 In a real sense, the home is an investment, and interest
for the acquisition or improvement of that investment qualifies for
deduction just as would interest to purchase any other invest-
ment.290 By definition, however, proceeds from any borrowing
above that to purchase or improve the residence generally will be
expended for purposes other than the acquisition or improvement
of a residence. The purpose of the expenditure should control
deductibility, not the happenstance that the residence secures the
debt. The only amount that should qualify as residence interest is
the actual amount of the debt incurred to purchase or improve the
residence. For these reasons, Congress should limit qualified resi-
dence interest strictly to interest on acquisition and home improve-
ment loans.
The rationale for allowing a homeowner to treat loans as
qualified residence loans up to the mortgage's original balance, to
the homeowner's cost basis, or to the home's fair market value is
not as persuasive as the one limiting the qualified debt to the
remaining acquisition debt balance. The appeal for these other
options rests on the homeowner's having spent funds to satisfy
some of the indebtedness. To illustrate, a homeowner that main-
tained a larger mortgage balance, placing the excess funds in a
liquid account, could draw upon the account and continue to
deduct all the mortgage interest. On the other hand, the homeowner
that discharged part of the mortgage, or paid a larger than neces-
sary downpayment at the initial purchase in an attempt to discharge
the loan as soon and as much as possible, would be forced to
borrow without qualifying for the interest deduction. Not allowing
- See supra notes 229-242 and accompanying text.
-" Because many persons buying homes do not borrow for any investment other than
their home, and because of the home's unique role in our culture, Congress easily can
justify a current year deduction for home mortgage interest rather than subjecting the home
mortgage interest deduction to the investment interest limitations.
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the additional deduction, therefore, seemingly penalizes the more
conscientious or financially conservative taxpayer.
For many people, moreover, a home is their main investment.
Equity in the home serves as a financial reservoir to be used in
times of need or convenience for extraordinary expenditures. The
equity represents both the amount of the original purchase price
and the appreciation in the home's value above the purchase price.
A homeowner can draw against equity instead of selling the home.
By not allowing an interest deduction for loans on that equity,
Congress is turning its back on the American who has sacrificed
to create home equity. 291
Although having the potential to inspire fiery rhetoric, the
above reasons are not persuasive enough to justify an interest
deduction for interest on home equity indebtedness. Several reasons
counsel against such an allowance. First, to allow the interest
deduction admits that, at least for home equity loans, the deter-
minative factor for interest deductibility is not the use of the loan
proceeds but instead the collateral pledged. Although a rational
system for allowing interest deductibility based on methods other
than use of proceeds might be plausible, 292 Congress currently opts
for characterization based on use of loan proceeds. 293 Congress
should not make an exception for home equity indebtedness.
Second, because the pledging requirement for home equity
indebtedness does not serve to identify the use of the loan proceeds,
291 This logic, if accepted, should not stop with the home. The taxpayer's stock in a
closely held business, or a sole proprietor's business assets, just like his home, represent
savings and sacrifice. The taxpayer should be able to borrow against the equity in those
assets and be allowed an interest deduction for the same reasons that justify an interest
deduction for loans secured by the residence. Even if Congress expanded its rationale
beyond homes to other assets, it could distinguish loans secured by assets that are held for
investment or business purposes, assuming that homes are held for investment, from
unsecured loans and loans secured by assets not held for investment or business purposes,
such as most automobile loans and household appliance loans. Congress then could allow
an interest deduction only for loans the proceeds of which are used for business or
investment purposes and for loans secured by investment or business assets, including the
home as an investment. See also McIntyre, supra note 265, at 773 (proposing allowing
interest deduction on loans to the extent loan proceeds do not exceed the value of the
taxpayer's assets, net of outstanding liabilities). The major criticism of this approach is that
it denies interest deductions only to those persons that do not own assets, which discriminates
against persons whose main asset is their labor. If the conceptual justification for interest
deduction rests on the source of repayment, all interest should be deductible because nearly
all interest obligations and debt principal will be retired with funds acquired through profit-
making activities or holdings. The rule holds for unsecured debt as well as secured debt.
"2 See supra note 232.
"9 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(c) (1987).
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it seems unwise. If Congress wants to allow liberal personal interest
deductions it should do so without connecting personal interest
and home equity. The pledging requirement increases the likelihood
of a creditor foreclosing on a home, 294 and has no logical connec-
tion to personal interest deductions. In addition, some real estate
economists are speculating that encouraging home equity loans
might hamper sales of higher priced homes. The prediction is based
on the traditional home buying process. Homebuyers historically
trade up to more expensive homes by selling their homes to first-
time buyers and using the equity to make a substantial payment
on the newer homes. By depleting their equity for current con-
sumption, homeowners will not be able to afford to move up to
more expensive homes. 295
A third criticism of allowing an interest deduction on home
equity indebtedness is that such a deduction discriminates against
taxpayers without home equity. Congress enacted the home equity
loan interest deduction provision to ease borrowing for education
or health care, to help families, for unforeseen emergencies, and
maybe even to help personal purchases. 296 These policy concerns
justify interest deductions for all taxpayers, not just for those
taxpayers that have the luxury of securing debt with their home
equity.
For example, a parent or recent graduate should not be able
to deduct interest paid on a student loan because the parent or the
graduate can pledge a residence as collateral while denying the
2" "In any event we will be encouraging homeowners to take second and third
mortgages on their homes, which I question as public policy." 132 CoNG. Rac. S7398 (daily
ed. June 12, 1986) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). Several articles warn of the risks of home
equity loans. See, e.g., Looking for a Home Equity Loan? Look Carefully, Bus. WK.,
April 23, 1990, at 128; Donald R. Katz, Second Thoughts on HELs, EsQumE, Feb. 1988,
at 61.
2" See John Cunniff, Equity Loans Draining Funds, May Cause Serious Problems For
Real Estate Industry, Bmxw."roiw Naws, July 3, 1991, at 7B, col. 1. According to the
article, which cites the Mortgage Bankers Association of America for its data, the total
equity in U.S. homes fell $300 billion from 1989 to 1990 in part because of home equity
loans. See id. Some equity decline results from the decline in property values generally.
Even if the decline in equity represents nothing more than a shifting of debt to home equity
debt, such that the consumer debt has not increased significantly, the shift could be
damaging to the home industry. In contrast to debt not secured by the residence, home
equity loans often must be satisfied with the proceeds from a sale of the residence, leaving
less immediate funds for purchasing a new home. Consequently, some homeowners will be
more reluctant to sell one home to purchase another. Even if the homeowners are able to
substitute collateral, psychologically, they may perceive themselves as having no home equity
to use to purchase a higher priced home.
m See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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same deduction to the parent or graduate owning no home. 297 The
same policy concerns that justify an interest deduction apply re-
gardless of whether a taxpayer has home equity. 298
C. Personal Interest
1. Authorized Purposes
Any significant revision of the qualified residence interest de-
duction, therefore, should delete the provision for a separate in-
terest deduction on home equity indebtedness. Whether Congress
should deny all personal interest deductions is a separate issue. The
debate, however, should not implicate qualified residences at all.
If Congress authorizes a personal interest deduction, it should not
attempt to limit deductions to interest on loans incurred for specific
purposes such as education, health, or unforeseen emergencies.
2" An anecdote illustrates the problem. A recent law school graduate wanted to deduct
interest, which currently is nondeductible, on his $30,000 student loan. His mother enjoyed
significant equity in her home. He was going to suggest to his mother that she give him
$10,000 in December and give him and his wife $10,000 each in January. He would pay
his $30,000 student loan in full. His mother, if she needed to borrow the money to make
the gifts, could deduct any interest she paid as long as she pledged her home to secure the
debt. The Author has not learned if the graduate's mother reacted as joyously to the idea
as did her son.
The same tax result might follow if the mother loaned the money to her son on an
interest free demand note. The mother would be deemed, under I.R.C. § 7872 (1988), as
having made a gift of the foregone interest, but because the loan amount was under
$100,000 and the loan proceeds immediately were spent to retire the student loan, she will
not be required to impute any interest income. See I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1). The imputed gift
amount would be below the $10,000 annual exclusion for gift tax purposes. The mother
could still deduct any interest she paid on any borrowings to loan the money to her son as
long as she pledged her home to secure the debt. The only question would be whether the
transaction falls under the § 7872(d)(1)(B) tax avoidance of any federal tax provision.
2" Usually, a homeowner builds equity over time, more so from value appreciation of
the home than reduction of loan principal. Some graduates will have equity to secure their
student loans. Some students may have purchased a home before entering law school and,
therefore, may have some built-up equity upon graduation. Other students could make a
large cash downpayment on a new home. Most recent law school graduates probably cannot
make a large downpayment. For example, a recent graduate may buy a home with built-in
equity. As an anecdote, a recent graduate planned to purchase a home shortly after taking
the bar exam. In the process of negotiating for the home, the graduate hired an appraiser
that valued the home at an amount that exceeded the ultimate purchase price by about
$40,000. The graduate interpreted the plain words of the statute to allow him to have
$40,000 home equity immediately upon the closing date, assuming no dramatic market shifts
in value occurred between the original appraisal and the closing. The graduate planned to
borrow against that equity to pay off his student loans, thereby qualifying for the interest
deduction.
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Too many legitimate purposes would be omitted. In addition, the
tracing problem becomes acute when loan proceeds are used for
services or intangibles, especially in determining interest deductions
in years subsequent to the receipt of the service or intangible but
while the loan is still outstanding. Requiring the residence to secure
the loan solves the tracing problem for residence acquisition inter-
est.29 No such convenient analog exists for other expenditures.
As a more manageable solution, Congress simply might allow
a maximum amount of personal interest each year. Instead of a
fixed amount, Congress may want to set a limit recalculated an-
nually to adjust for changes in interest rates. For example, Con-
gress could direct the Treasury to issue annually a maximum
allowable personal interest deduction amount determined by mul-
tiplying a standard indicator of market interest rate by a fixed debt
amount, such as $100,000. Thus, if the applicable. interest rate for
one year is nine percent, taxpayers could deduct up to $9000
personal interest. If the applicable interest rate rises to twelve
percent in a subsequent year, taxpayers would be allowed to deduct
up to $12,000 personal interest.
2. Determining Maximum Amount Deductible
The alternative choice of allowing interest on a maximum debt
amount rather than on a maximum interest amount should be
rejected. This approach takes into consideration that creditors charge
different interest rates depending on the loan's purpose or terms,
on the borrower's credit worthiness, and on the economic environ-
ment when the loan is made. By using the debt amount to deter-
mine the amount of interest deduction, the approach assumes the
proper guide to interest limitation is the amount of money bor-
rowed rather than the actual amount of interest paid during the
year. If this is a true assumption, then the allowable interest
deduction should be the actual interest paid on total debt amount
up to a maximum debt amount. The actual interest charged on
this debt amount would indicate most accurately the taxpayer's
appropriate maximum deductible interest. Despite any theoretical
2" A special provision for home acquisition indebtedness is workable, and in fact
necessary. Even pledging of the residence should be retained as a condition of any special
home acquisition indebtedness provision. The recommendation in the text is that Congress
should not set out other approved purposes nor require any securing requirement for a
personal interest deduction provision.
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merits, 00 this approach should be rejected for administrative rea-
sons. The use of a maximum debt amount rather than a maximum
interest amount would be administratively burdensome if the tax-
payer incurred multiple debts, or incurred debts at different times
during the year.
The current law restricts interest based on a maximum debt
formula. 01 A taxpayer can deduct interest paid on $1,000,000
acquisition debt and on $100,000 home equity debt. The $1,000,000
is high enough that only a few taxpayers will encounter any diffi-
culties determining their total acquisition indebtedness. Determin-
ing the amount of outstanding acquisition debt is made practicable
because the homeowner enters into few acquisition or home im-
provement loans with respect to the residence. On the other hand,
a homeowner may enter into many obligations brought under the
home equity indebtedness umbrella. Determining if the taxpayer
has taken deductions on no more than the lesser of $100,000 of
debt or the amount of home equity can be problematic. The
administrative burdens of insuring that taxpayers accurately deter-
mine and limit the authorized interest deduction amount counsels
limiting interest based on interest paid rather than on amount
borrowed despite any theoretical discrepancies for the small per-
centage of taxpayers at the margins.
Currently, Congress, for administrative reasons, must rely on
a maximum debt amount instead of the more straightforward
maximum interest limitation because the amount of personal inter-
- Limitations based on interest amounts rather than based on debt amounts in fact
may be theoretically more meritorious. The tax laws should tax based on wherewithal to
pay. The amount of interest paid is the best indicator of actual wherewithal to pay rather
than the underlying debt amount. Horizontal equity analysis would emphasize the effect
the deduction had on taxable income. A reasonable conclusion could be reached that the
proper base of limitation should be a maximum interest amount. For example, assume two
taxpayers each earned $50,000, one borrowing $100,000 at 10% interest, and the other
borrowing $110,000 at 9% interest. The first, therefore, paid $10,000 interest and the second
paid $9900 interest. If the maximum allowable interest deduction was $10,000 each should
be able to deduct their interest. If the limit was $9900, both would deduct $9900. The first
taxpayer would be denied $100 deduction even though he borrowed less money. The
difference in taxable income would be the $100 deduction denied for actual interest paid.
In contrast, limiting the interest deduction to a debt amount of $100,000 would result in
the first taxpayer receiving a deduction for the full $10,000 he paid while limiting the second
to a $9000 deduction even though she paid $9900 interest for the year. In this second
approach, the taxable incomes differ by $1000 even though the amount of interest paid was
only $100 different. The difference results from the amount of debt and the terms, neither
directly affecting the taxpayer's immediate ability to pay tax.
-o- See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii), (C)(ii).
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est a taxpayer can deduct on home equity indebtedness is a direct
function of the home equity. Taxpayers are not all permitted the
same maximum interest deduction. Taxpayers can deduct interest
only on the lesser of home equity, outstanding home equity in-
debtedness, or $100,000 of debt. Each taxpayer is subject to a
different amount. If Congress eliminates the inequitable qualifica-
tion yardstick inherent in the home equity calculation, it can shift
its limiting standard from maximum debt amount to maximum
interest amount.
3. Categories of Interest
Congress has received several proposals to simplify interest
deductions. 02 One simplification proposal favors combining all
nonbusiness interest and limiting the deduction for nonbusiness
interest to the amount of investment income or to the amount of
investment income plus an additional prescribed amount. 0 3 Interest
not currently deductible would be carried forward. °4 The proposals
allow for an additional deduction for qualified residence interest
as it may survive any simplification proposals. 30 5 Although these
proposals simplify the tax laws by eliminating the characterization
of nonbusiness interest into investment and personal interest, the
proposals defeat the congressional rationale for denying personal
interest in the first place.
By combining investment and personal interest, and allowing
interest deductions to the extent of investment income, the proposal
would enable taxpayers with substantial interest, dividend, rental,
royalty, and capital gain income to deduct all personal interest.
Meanwhile, many lower and middle income taxpayers, whose in-
come is primarily from wages, would be severely limited in the
502 See supra notes 105-125 and accompanying text (setting out proposal by staff of
Joint Committee on Taxation).
301 See J.A. Pechman, The Future of the Income Tax, 80 AM. EcoN. Ry. 1, 13
(1990); 1990 TAX SIw MPL-CATiON PROPOSAl, supra note 105, at 111 (letter of James P.
Holden, Chair, ABA Section on Taxation); id., supra note 105, at 13. Although labelled
simplification proposals, some new proposals merely substitute one set of complications for
another. The ABA proposal, for example, envisions a three tier evaluation of nonbusiness
interest plus a tiered carryover schedule. As long as Congress distinguishes types of interest
payments under the tax laws, complications will arise.
30" See 1990 TAx SImPXncATiON PROpoSAuS, supra note 105, at 111 (letter of James P.
Holden, Chair, ABA Section on Taxation). Under one proposal, no carryover is allowed.
See id. at 13.
30 See, e.g., id., supra note 105, at 13.
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amount of interest deductible since their income is earned income
rather than investment income. Ironically Congress originally pro-
posed denying personal interest when loan proceeds were spent for
luxury items.3 0 A taxpayer that borrowed money to enjoy a stan-
dard of living that was clearly out of the ordinary was not supposed
to be able to deduct the interest.3 7 The prescribed limitation on
the amount of deductible interest was thought to result in a higher
percentage of interest deductions going to lower and middle-income
taxpayers. 08 By allowing persons with substantial investment in-
come to deduct all personal interest, while limiting or denying full
interest deductions to wage earners, these proposals defeat the very
goals the interest denial provisions were meant to accomplish.
A preferable revision would continue the distinction between
investment interest and personal interest. Investment interest would
be subject to the current investment interest limitation rules. Per-
sonal interest would be allowed up to a prescribed maximum limit.
The personal interest limitation would be in lieu of any home
equity interest allowance. Any personal interest not deductible in
the current year would be lost. If Congress wants taxpayers to take
full advantage of the allowable personal interest, it could authorize
taxpayers to include investment interest as personal interest to the
extent a taxpayer's personal interest is less than the prescribed
maximum allowable.
CONCLUSION
The home mortgage interest deduction is in no immediate dan-
ger of being repealed. In recent discussions, however, many sup-
porters of the deduction have conceded that the section authorizing
the deduction is an exception to the prohibition against deductions
for personal interest.3°9 In fact, the home is an investment, and the
mortgage interest deduction is as justified as any other investment
interest deduction. The special treatment afforded home mortgage
interest is that the taxpayer can deduct the interest in the year paid
without being subject to the investment interest, limitations. The
deduction for home mortgage interest needs to be limited to interest
0 See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. 102 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2997.
See id.
See id.
30 See, e.g., Charles 0. Galvin, The Deduction of Nonbusiness Interest: An Exercise
in Planned Confusion, 41 TAx LAW. 803, 807 (1988).
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on loans to acquire and improve principal residences. Interest on
indebtedness to acquire all other real estate investments, including
vacation homes and second homes, also is investment interest and
should be deductible, subject to the investment interest limitations.
In contrast, Congress should repeal the home equity indebted-
ness provision. The concept is a loophole allowing personal interest
deductions. Its benefits are limited to persons having home equity.
If a personal interest deduction is warranted, it should be available
to all taxpayers. A person that pays interest on a $30,000 student
loan, for example, should have the same opportunity to deduct
that interest as the person who fortuitously owns a home with
substantial equity. Any limitation on the amount of personal in-
terest should be based on a maximum interest amount rather than
on a maximum loan amount. Lastly, Congress should not attempt
to identify acceptable uses of loan proceeds for any personal in-
terest deduction.
Fortunately, changes seem to be in the offing. Congress' per-
ception that financial institutions and taxpayers are abusing the
home equity provisions, combined with some dissatisfaction with
the limitations based on interest characterization, provides impetus
for congressional action in the near future. Congress should sepa-
rate the personal interest debate from the home mortgage interest
debate before enacting any amendments.
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